The Evolution of Conventions

Consider an n-person game that is played repeatedly, but by different agents. In each period, n players are drawn at random from a large finite population. Each player chooses an optimal strategy based on a sample of information about what others players have done in the past. The sampling defines a...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Econometrica 1993-01, Vol.61 (1), p.57-84
1. Verfasser:	Young, H. Peyton
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Applied sciences Behavior Boats Business strategies Conformity Conventions Coordination games Econometrics Economic models Economic theory Equilibrium Exact sciences and technology Experiments Game theory Games Markov analysis Markov chains Markov processes Nash equilibrium Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Sample size Social evolution Studies Vertices
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!