Strategic non-intervention and the choice of trade policy for international oligopoly
This paper analyzes a game of strategic trade policy between governments who may choose among quantity controls, subsidies, and non-intervention as policy instruments. Central to the analysis is our view of non-intervention as a distinct policy choice. We derive conditions under which non-interventi...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of international economics 1993-02, Vol.34 (1), p.73-93 |
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| container_end_page | 93 |
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| container_title | Journal of international economics |
| container_volume | 34 |
| creator | Hwang, Hae-Shin Schulman, Craig T. |
| description | This paper analyzes a game of strategic trade policy between governments who may choose among quantity controls, subsidies, and non-intervention as policy instruments. Central to the analysis is our view of non-intervention as a distinct policy choice. We derive conditions under which non-intervention is strictly preferred to the alternative instruments. Preferences between non-intervention and the Nash equilibrium subsidy confirm to a simple distance measure involving the Stackelberg leadership subsidy; the subsidy level (zero or Nash) that is closest to the Stackelberg subsidy being preferred. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/0022-1996(93)90067-8 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0022-1996 |
| ispartof | Journal of international economics, 1993-02, Vol.34 (1), p.73-93 |
| issn | 0022-1996 1873-0353 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37441358 |
| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Balance of trade Economic models Game theory International trade Market equilibrium Non-intervention Oligopoly Protectionism Studies Subsidies Trade policy |
| title | Strategic non-intervention and the choice of trade policy for international oligopoly |
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