Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation
We study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities. Workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions. The whole decision process is modelled as an extensive-form bargaining game. Workers form a joint union when the siz...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Review of economic studies 1989, Vol.56 (1), p.59-76 |
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| container_title | The Review of economic studies |
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| creator | Jun, Byoung Heon |
| description | We study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities. Workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions. The whole decision process is modelled as an extensive-form bargaining game. Workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar. In the first case, there is a wage differential which is more (less) than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller (larger) than that of the less productive. In the second case, there is no wage differential. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/2297749 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0034-6527 |
| ispartof | The Review of economic studies, 1989, Vol.56 (1), p.59-76 |
| issn | 0034-6527 1467-937X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37236731 |
| source | Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Bargaining Bargaining power Collective bargaining Economic models Labor unionization Labor unions Productivity Revenue Trade unions Union certification Wage differential Wages |
| title | Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation |
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