On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information

In an interaction it is possible that one agent has features it is aware of but the opponent is not. These features (e.g. cost, valuation or fighting ability) are referred to as the agent’s type. The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric situations of this kind. In one model the type o...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Mathematical social sciences 2009-11, Vol.58 (3), p.310-321
Hauptverfasser:	Amann, Erwin, Possajennikov, Alex
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Asymmetric information Dynamic stability Economic dynamics Evolution Evolutionary economics Game theory Incomplete information games Incomplete information games Evolution Replicator dynamic Dynamic stability Replicator dynamic Replicator dynamics
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