Earnings management and initial public offerings: The case of the depository industry

In a typical IPO, insiders are “net sellers” of IPO shares; however, in a demutualizing thrift, insiders are “net buyers” of IPO shares. Using a sample of mutual depository IPOs, we find evidence consistent with earnings management prior to the conversion of mutual thrifts. We find on average that m...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of banking & finance 2009-12, Vol.33 (12), p.2363-2372
Hauptverfasser: Adams, Brian, Carow, Kenneth A., Perry, Tod
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container_title Journal of banking & finance
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creator Adams, Brian
Carow, Kenneth A.
Perry, Tod
description In a typical IPO, insiders are “net sellers” of IPO shares; however, in a demutualizing thrift, insiders are “net buyers” of IPO shares. Using a sample of mutual depository IPOs, we find evidence consistent with earnings management prior to the conversion of mutual thrifts. We find on average that mutuals report lower ROA and increased loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves in the period prior to the demutualization. Using a two-stage approach, we also find that the level of discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary reserves are positively related to both the level of insider participation in the IPO and the first-day returns to investors. Our results are consistent with management of mutual thrifts benefiting at the conversion from reduced pre-IPO earnings and book equity resulting from earnings management.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.06.015
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ispartof Journal of banking & finance, 2009-12, Vol.33 (12), p.2363-2372
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1872-6372
language eng
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source RePEc; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present)
subjects Demutualization
Earnings
Earnings management
Earnings management Thrift Mutual Demutualization Initial public offering Loan loss provisions Reserves
Financial management
Initial public offering
Initial public offerings
Investors
Loan loss allowances
Loan loss provisions
Loans
Loss
Mutual
Mutual savings institutions
Rates of return
Reserves
Savings & loan associations
Strategic planning
Studies
Thrift
title Earnings management and initial public offerings: The case of the depository industry
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