Electing Directors
Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendations, have little economic impact on shareholde...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of finance (New York) 2009-10, Vol.64 (5), p.2389-2421 |
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| container_issue | 5 |
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| container_title | The Journal of finance (New York) |
| container_volume | 64 |
| creator | CAI, JIE GARNER, JACQUELINE L. WALKLING, RALPH A. |
| description | Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendations, have little economic impact on shareholder votes—even poorly performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless, fewer votes lead to lower "abnormal" CEO compensation and a higher probability of removing poison pills, classified boards, and CEOs. Meanwhile, director votes have little impact on election outcomes, firm performance, or director reputation. These results provide important benchmarks for the current debate on election reforms. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0022-1082 |
| ispartof | The Journal of finance (New York), 2009-10, Vol.64 (5), p.2389-2421 |
| issn | 0022-1082 1540-6261 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37203817 |
| source | Wiley Online Library All Journals; JSTOR |
| subjects | Boards of directors Business management Business structures Chief executive officers Common stock Corporate governance Executive compensation Financial performance Majority voting Plurality voting Proxy reporting Proxy statements Senior management Shareholder voting Shareholders Stockholders Studies Voting |
| title | Electing Directors |
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