Mutually Acceptable Courses of Action
We offer a game-theoretic framework that enables the analysis of situations whereby rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. We introduce a new solution concept: a mutually acceptable course of action, which can be viewed as an (incomplet...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economic theory 2009-07, Vol.40 (1), p.91-112 |
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| container_end_page | 112 |
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| container_issue | 1 |
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| container_title | Economic theory |
| container_volume | 40 |
| creator | Greenberg, Joseph Gupta, Sudheer Luo, Xiao |
| description | We offer a game-theoretic framework that enables the analysis of situations whereby rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. We introduce a new solution concept: a mutually acceptable course of action, which can be viewed as an (incomplete) contract or a social norm that free rational individuals would be willing to follow for their own diverse reasons. We show that by varying the degree of completeness of the underlying course of action, our concept can be related to commonly used solutions, such as perfect equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (rationalizable) self-confirming equilibrium, and rationalizable outcomes. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00199-008-0349-5 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0938-2259 |
| ispartof | Economic theory, 2009-07, Vol.40 (1), p.91-112 |
| issn | 0938-2259 1432-0479 |
| language | eng |
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| source | SpringerLink Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Decision making Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Equilibrium Game Theory Incomplete contracts Knowledge Microeconomics Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Normal form games Public Finance Rational choice theory Rationality Reason Research Article Self confirming equilibrium Social and Behav. Sciences Social norms Strategic planning Studies Vertices |
| title | Mutually Acceptable Courses of Action |
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