Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity

We consider the makespan-minimization problem on unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design. No truthful mechanisms with non-trivial approximation guarantees are known for this multidimensional domain. We study a well-motivated special case (also a multidimensional domain), wh...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 2009-09, Vol.67 (1), p.99-124
Hauptverfasser:	Lavi, Ron, Swamy, Chaitanya
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Algorithms Approximation Credibility Cyclical analysis Design Linear programming Multidimensional analysis Optimization algorithms Production scheduling Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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