Ownership of dual class shares and passive investment strategies

Ownership of dual class shares and passive investment strategies

Previous studies of firms with two classes of stock find a price premium for the class with superior voting rights over the restricted voting rights shares. This premium changes over time and is related to the likelihood of a contested takeover attempt. These findings have implications for both pass...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Corporate Ownership and Control 2008, Vol.6 (1-2), p.301-311
Hauptverfasser: Marquette, Christopher J., Williams, Thomas G. E.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Investors
Stock returns
Stocks
Take-overs
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 311
container_issue 1-2
container_start_page 301
container_title Corporate Ownership and Control
container_volume 6
creator Marquette, Christopher J.
Williams, Thomas G. E.
description Previous studies of firms with two classes of stock find a price premium for the class with superior voting rights over the restricted voting rights shares. This premium changes over time and is related to the likelihood of a contested takeover attempt. These findings have implications for both passive and active investors. We find that for passive, buy-and-hold investors, restricted voting shares dominate superior voting shares in mean-variance space. This relationship also holds for a four factor model specification of stock returns. Our evidence indicates that passive, buy-and-hold investors can achieve a higher return with restricted vote shares than superior vote shares with no increase in either stand-alone or portfolio risk
doi_str_mv 10.22495/cocv6i1c2p7
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37150566</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>37150566</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2197-a1014627ca84a7154bba5b6078c0e8b7131d074e827a50471c4bb2c2fa556623</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpNkM1Lw0AQxRdRsGhv_gF78mR0Zz8y6U0pfkGhl97DZLuxC2kSd9KK_72L9eDpvQc_HjNPiBtQ91rbhXvwgz-WEbwe8UzMoAJVGOXwPHvUWCy00ZdizhwbZS0agwAz8bj-6kPiXRzl0MrtgTrpO2KWvKMUWFK_lWPO8Rhk7I-Bp33oJ8lToil8xMDX4qKljsP8T6_E5uV5s3wrVuvX9-XTqvAaFlgQKLClRk-VJQRnm4ZcUyqsvApVg2Bgq9CGSiM5ZRF8JrTXLTlXltpcidtT7ZiGz0M-o95H9qHrqA_Dgev8jVOZzODdCfRpYE6hrccU95S-a1D171D1v6HMD3DrXFg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>37150566</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Ownership of dual class shares and passive investment strategies</title><source>Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals</source><creator>Marquette, Christopher J. ; Williams, Thomas G. E.</creator><creatorcontrib>Marquette, Christopher J. ; Williams, Thomas G. E.</creatorcontrib><description>Previous studies of firms with two classes of stock find a price premium for the class with superior voting rights over the restricted voting rights shares. This premium changes over time and is related to the likelihood of a contested takeover attempt. These findings have implications for both passive and active investors. We find that for passive, buy-and-hold investors, restricted voting shares dominate superior voting shares in mean-variance space. This relationship also holds for a four factor model specification of stock returns. Our evidence indicates that passive, buy-and-hold investors can achieve a higher return with restricted vote shares than superior vote shares with no increase in either stand-alone or portfolio risk</description><identifier>ISSN: 1727-9232</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1810-3057</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.22495/cocv6i1c2p7</identifier><language>eng</language><subject>Investors ; Stock returns ; Stocks ; Take-overs</subject><ispartof>Corporate Ownership and Control, 2008, Vol.6 (1-2), p.301-311</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2197-a1014627ca84a7154bba5b6078c0e8b7131d074e827a50471c4bb2c2fa556623</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2197-a1014627ca84a7154bba5b6078c0e8b7131d074e827a50471c4bb2c2fa556623</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-2388-0090</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,778,782,4012,27906,27907,27908</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Marquette, Christopher J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Williams, Thomas G. E.</creatorcontrib><title>Ownership of dual class shares and passive investment strategies</title><title>Corporate Ownership and Control</title><description>Previous studies of firms with two classes of stock find a price premium for the class with superior voting rights over the restricted voting rights shares. This premium changes over time and is related to the likelihood of a contested takeover attempt. These findings have implications for both passive and active investors. We find that for passive, buy-and-hold investors, restricted voting shares dominate superior voting shares in mean-variance space. This relationship also holds for a four factor model specification of stock returns. Our evidence indicates that passive, buy-and-hold investors can achieve a higher return with restricted vote shares than superior vote shares with no increase in either stand-alone or portfolio risk</description><subject>Investors</subject><subject>Stock returns</subject><subject>Stocks</subject><subject>Take-overs</subject><issn>1727-9232</issn><issn>1810-3057</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2008</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpNkM1Lw0AQxRdRsGhv_gF78mR0Zz8y6U0pfkGhl97DZLuxC2kSd9KK_72L9eDpvQc_HjNPiBtQ91rbhXvwgz-WEbwe8UzMoAJVGOXwPHvUWCy00ZdizhwbZS0agwAz8bj-6kPiXRzl0MrtgTrpO2KWvKMUWFK_lWPO8Rhk7I-Bp33oJ8lToil8xMDX4qKljsP8T6_E5uV5s3wrVuvX9-XTqvAaFlgQKLClRk-VJQRnm4ZcUyqsvApVg2Bgq9CGSiM5ZRF8JrTXLTlXltpcidtT7ZiGz0M-o95H9qHrqA_Dgev8jVOZzODdCfRpYE6hrccU95S-a1D171D1v6HMD3DrXFg</recordid><startdate>2008</startdate><enddate>2008</enddate><creator>Marquette, Christopher J.</creator><creator>Williams, Thomas G. E.</creator><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2388-0090</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>2008</creationdate><title>Ownership of dual class shares and passive investment strategies</title><author>Marquette, Christopher J. ; Williams, Thomas G. E.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c2197-a1014627ca84a7154bba5b6078c0e8b7131d074e827a50471c4bb2c2fa556623</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2008</creationdate><topic>Investors</topic><topic>Stock returns</topic><topic>Stocks</topic><topic>Take-overs</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Marquette, Christopher J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Williams, Thomas G. E.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Corporate Ownership and Control</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Marquette, Christopher J.</au><au>Williams, Thomas G. E.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Ownership of dual class shares and passive investment strategies</atitle><jtitle>Corporate Ownership and Control</jtitle><date>2008</date><risdate>2008</risdate><volume>6</volume><issue>1-2</issue><spage>301</spage><epage>311</epage><pages>301-311</pages><issn>1727-9232</issn><eissn>1810-3057</eissn><abstract>Previous studies of firms with two classes of stock find a price premium for the class with superior voting rights over the restricted voting rights shares. This premium changes over time and is related to the likelihood of a contested takeover attempt. These findings have implications for both passive and active investors. We find that for passive, buy-and-hold investors, restricted voting shares dominate superior voting shares in mean-variance space. This relationship also holds for a four factor model specification of stock returns. Our evidence indicates that passive, buy-and-hold investors can achieve a higher return with restricted vote shares than superior vote shares with no increase in either stand-alone or portfolio risk</abstract><doi>10.22495/cocv6i1c2p7</doi><tpages>11</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2388-0090</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 1727-9232
ispartof Corporate Ownership and Control, 2008, Vol.6 (1-2), p.301-311
issn 1727-9232
1810-3057
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37150566
source Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals
subjects Investors
Stock returns
Stocks
Take-overs
title Ownership of dual class shares and passive investment strategies
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-16T16%3A28%3A31IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Ownership%20of%20dual%20class%20shares%20and%20passive%20investment%20strategies&rft.jtitle=Corporate%20Ownership%20and%20Control&rft.au=Marquette,%20Christopher%20J.&rft.date=2008&rft.volume=6&rft.issue=1-2&rft.spage=301&rft.epage=311&rft.pages=301-311&rft.issn=1727-9232&rft.eissn=1810-3057&rft_id=info:doi/10.22495/cocv6i1c2p7&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E37150566%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=37150566&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true