Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions

When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment rules will not ensure truthfulness). We dev...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 2008-11, Vol.64 (2), p.612-631
Hauptverfasser:	Mu'alem, Ahuva, Nisan, Noam
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Approximation Approximation algorithms Auctions Bidding Combinatorial auctions Computational methods Heuristic Heuristics Mechanism design Mechanism design Combinatorial auctions Multi-unit auctions Multi-unit combinatorial auctions Approximation algorithms Multi-unit auctions Multi-unit combinatorial auctions Reliability Studies Truth
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