Optimal dissent in organizations

We model an organization as a two-agent hierarchy: an informed Decision Maker in charge of selecting projects and a (possibly) uninformed Implementer in charge of their execution. Both have intrinsic preferences over projects. This paper models the costs and benefits of divergence between their pref...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Review of economic studies 2009-04, Vol.76(2) (267), p.761-794
Hauptverfasser:	Landier, Augustin, Sraer, David, Thesmar, David
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Decision making Management science Organization theory Project management
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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