A STACKELBERG MODEL OF CHILD SUPPORT AND WELFARE

This article models the child support and welfare decisions of never‐married parents on welfare as a Stackelberg game. The mother chooses whether to exit welfare, report paternity, and to obtain a formal child support order. If a child support order is obtained, the father chooses whether to comply...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International economic review (Philadelphia) 2008-05, Vol.49 (2), p.515-546
1. Verfasser:	Roff, Jennifer
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Child care Child support Child welfare Economic models Game theory Parents & parenting Paternity Studies Welfare economics Welfare state
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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