Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players

This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural ext...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Review of economic studies 1990-10, Vol.57 (4), p.555-573
Hauptverfasser:	Fudenberg, Drew, Kreps, David M., Maskin, Eric S.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Collaboration Discounting Economic theory Game theory Martingales Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Random allocation Random variables Repeated games Unobservables
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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