Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players
This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural ext...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Review of economic studies 1990-10, Vol.57 (4), p.555-573 |
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| container_title | The Review of economic studies |
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| creator | Fudenberg, Drew Kreps, David M. Maskin, Eric S. |
| description | This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the definitions of the feasible payoffs and minmax values. In fact, this extension does obtain under the assumption that each player's choice of a mixed strategy for the stage game is publicly observable but, in contrast to standard repeated games, the set of equilibrium payoffs is different if players can observe only their opponents' realized actions. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/2298086 |
| format | Article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0034-6527 |
| ispartof | The Review of economic studies, 1990-10, Vol.57 (4), p.555-573 |
| issn | 0034-6527 1467-937X |
| language | eng |
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| source | Periodicals Index Online; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Collaboration Discounting Economic theory Game theory Martingales Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Random allocation Random variables Repeated games Unobservables |
| title | Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players |
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