A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and Annex B countries
This paper proposes a computable dynamic game model of the strategic competition between Russia and developing countries (DCs), mainly represented by China, on the international market of emission permits created by the Kyoto Protocol. The model uses a formulation of (i) a demand function for permit...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic dynamics & control 2008-06, Vol.32 (6), p.1830-1856 |
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| container_title | Journal of economic dynamics & control |
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| creator | Bernard, A. Haurie, A. Vielle, M. Viguier, L. |
| description | This paper proposes a computable dynamic game model of the strategic competition between Russia and developing countries (DCs), mainly represented by China, on the international market of emission permits created by the Kyoto Protocol. The model uses a formulation of (i) a demand function for permits from Annex B countries and (ii) marginal abatement costs (MAC) in Russia and China provided by two detailed models. GEMINI-E3 is a computable general equilibrium model that provides the data to estimate Annex B demand for permits and MACs in Russia. POLES is a partial equilibrium model that is used to obtain MAC curves for China. The competitive scenario is compared with a monopoly situation where only Russia is allowed to play strategically. The impact of allowing DCs to intervene on the international emission trading market is thus assessed. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jedc.2007.07.001 |
| format | Article |
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| language | eng |
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| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete |
| subjects | Carbon China Climate change Competition Computable general equilibrium modeling Cournot–Nash equilibrium Developing countries Dynamic games Economic models Emission trading Emissions trading Environmental economics Equilibrium models Game theory Games General economic equilibrium Kyoto Protocol LDCs Nash equilibrium Russia Russian Federation Studies |
| title | A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and Annex B countries |
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