Pareto improving taxes
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by a package of anonymous commodity taxes that causes prices to adjust and markets to reclear at different levels of individual consumption. This constrained suboptimality of compe...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of mathematical economics 2008-07, Vol.44 (7), p.682-696 |
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| container_end_page | 696 |
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| container_issue | 7 |
| container_start_page | 682 |
| container_title | Journal of mathematical economics |
| container_volume | 44 |
| creator | Geanakoplos, John Polemarchakis, H.M. |
| description | We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by a package of anonymous commodity taxes that causes prices to adjust and markets to reclear at different levels of individual consumption. This constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations might provide a rationale for economic policy in economies with externalities. It shows that policy makers should look for good tax packages that help everybody, rather than thinking taxes must inevitably be bad for some lobby that will oppose them. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.07.007 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of mathematical economics, 2008-07, Vol.44 (7), p.682-696 |
| issn | 0304-4068 1873-1538 |
| language | eng |
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| source | RePEc; Access via ScienceDirect (Elsevier) |
| subjects | Commodities Commodity taxes Competition Constrained suboptimality Economic policy Excise taxes Externalities Externality Pareto optimum Policy making Studies Tax allocation Taxes |
| title | Pareto improving taxes |
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