Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees

Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees

In typical experiments on ultimatum bargaining, the game is described verbally and the majority of subjects deviate from subgame-perfect behavior. Proposers typically offer significantly more than the minimum possible and Responders reject “unfair” offers. In this work, we show that when the ultimat...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Games and economic behavior 2008-05, Vol.63 (1), p.292-307
Hauptverfasser: Stahl, Dale O., Haruvy, Ernan
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Bargaining
Deviation
Economic behaviour
Game theory
Preferences
Studies
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 307
container_issue 1
container_start_page 292
container_title Games and economic behavior
container_volume 63
creator Stahl, Dale O.
Haruvy, Ernan
description In typical experiments on ultimatum bargaining, the game is described verbally and the majority of subjects deviate from subgame-perfect behavior. Proposers typically offer significantly more than the minimum possible and Responders reject “unfair” offers. In this work, we show that when the ultimatum bargaining game is presented as an abstract game tree, the vast majority of behavior is consistent with individualistic preferences and subgame-perfection. This finding raises doubts about theories that ignore the potential influence of social context and experiments that do not control for social context.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.003
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36872537</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S0899825607001431</els_id><sourcerecordid>1464724721</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c484t-b7387a7b0db36eca2ce12db53177df45a398941472bef6ac072a0da8f06585343</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kE9r3DAQxUVJoJtNP0Bvpofc7Iwk25LpqSxpkxDIIclZSPJ4q2X9p5K9sN--s2zpIYccngbEe4-ZH2NfORQceH27K7boCgGgCtAFgPzEVhwayEWp5AVbgW6aXIuq_syuUtoBQCUUrBi8LG5re8wmjB36OYxDFoZs2c-ht_PSZ87GrQ1DGLbZHBHTNbvs7D7hl39zzd5-3r1u7vOn518Pmx9PuS91OedOSa2sctA6WaO3wiMXraskV6rtysrKRjclL5Vw2NXWgxIWWqs7qCtdyVKu2c25d4rjnwXTbPqQPO73dsBxSUbWWolKKjJ-e2fcjUscaDfDG8UV9QGZ-Nnk45hSxM5MkQ6MR8PBnACanSGA5gTQgDYEkDKP50zECf3_ACKegDk0ByNtLek5kiipaQQSJ02nr0YYSX2_557Kvp_LkJgdAkaTfMDBYxsiYTftGD5Y5S-8-pAo</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>197176580</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees</title><source>Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete - AutoHoldings</source><source>RePEc</source><creator>Stahl, Dale O. ; Haruvy, Ernan</creator><creatorcontrib>Stahl, Dale O. ; Haruvy, Ernan</creatorcontrib><description>In typical experiments on ultimatum bargaining, the game is described verbally and the majority of subjects deviate from subgame-perfect behavior. Proposers typically offer significantly more than the minimum possible and Responders reject “unfair” offers. In this work, we show that when the ultimatum bargaining game is presented as an abstract game tree, the vast majority of behavior is consistent with individualistic preferences and subgame-perfection. This finding raises doubts about theories that ignore the potential influence of social context and experiments that do not control for social context.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0899-8256</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1090-2473</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.003</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Duluth: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Bargaining ; Deviation ; Economic behaviour ; Game theory ; Preferences ; Studies</subject><ispartof>Games and economic behavior, 2008-05, Vol.63 (1), p.292-307</ispartof><rights>2007 Elsevier Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Academic Press May 2008</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c484t-b7387a7b0db36eca2ce12db53177df45a398941472bef6ac072a0da8f06585343</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c484t-b7387a7b0db36eca2ce12db53177df45a398941472bef6ac072a0da8f06585343</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.003$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3548,4006,27922,27923,45993</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeegamebe/v_3a63_3ay_3a2008_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a292-307.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Stahl, Dale O.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Haruvy, Ernan</creatorcontrib><title>Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees</title><title>Games and economic behavior</title><description>In typical experiments on ultimatum bargaining, the game is described verbally and the majority of subjects deviate from subgame-perfect behavior. Proposers typically offer significantly more than the minimum possible and Responders reject “unfair” offers. In this work, we show that when the ultimatum bargaining game is presented as an abstract game tree, the vast majority of behavior is consistent with individualistic preferences and subgame-perfection. This finding raises doubts about theories that ignore the potential influence of social context and experiments that do not control for social context.</description><subject>Bargaining</subject><subject>Deviation</subject><subject>Economic behaviour</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Preferences</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>0899-8256</issn><issn>1090-2473</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2008</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE9r3DAQxUVJoJtNP0Bvpofc7Iwk25LpqSxpkxDIIclZSPJ4q2X9p5K9sN--s2zpIYccngbEe4-ZH2NfORQceH27K7boCgGgCtAFgPzEVhwayEWp5AVbgW6aXIuq_syuUtoBQCUUrBi8LG5re8wmjB36OYxDFoZs2c-ht_PSZ87GrQ1DGLbZHBHTNbvs7D7hl39zzd5-3r1u7vOn518Pmx9PuS91OedOSa2sctA6WaO3wiMXraskV6rtysrKRjclL5Vw2NXWgxIWWqs7qCtdyVKu2c25d4rjnwXTbPqQPO73dsBxSUbWWolKKjJ-e2fcjUscaDfDG8UV9QGZ-Nnk45hSxM5MkQ6MR8PBnACanSGA5gTQgDYEkDKP50zECf3_ACKegDk0ByNtLek5kiipaQQSJ02nr0YYSX2_557Kvp_LkJgdAkaTfMDBYxsiYTftGD5Y5S-8-pAo</recordid><startdate>20080501</startdate><enddate>20080501</enddate><creator>Stahl, Dale O.</creator><creator>Haruvy, Ernan</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>Academic Press</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20080501</creationdate><title>Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees</title><author>Stahl, Dale O. ; Haruvy, Ernan</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c484t-b7387a7b0db36eca2ce12db53177df45a398941472bef6ac072a0da8f06585343</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2008</creationdate><topic>Bargaining</topic><topic>Deviation</topic><topic>Economic behaviour</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Preferences</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Stahl, Dale O.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Haruvy, Ernan</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Games and economic behavior</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Stahl, Dale O.</au><au>Haruvy, Ernan</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees</atitle><jtitle>Games and economic behavior</jtitle><date>2008-05-01</date><risdate>2008</risdate><volume>63</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>292</spage><epage>307</epage><pages>292-307</pages><issn>0899-8256</issn><eissn>1090-2473</eissn><abstract>In typical experiments on ultimatum bargaining, the game is described verbally and the majority of subjects deviate from subgame-perfect behavior. Proposers typically offer significantly more than the minimum possible and Responders reject “unfair” offers. In this work, we show that when the ultimatum bargaining game is presented as an abstract game tree, the vast majority of behavior is consistent with individualistic preferences and subgame-perfection. This finding raises doubts about theories that ignore the potential influence of social context and experiments that do not control for social context.</abstract><cop>Duluth</cop><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.003</doi><tpages>16</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0899-8256
ispartof Games and economic behavior, 2008-05, Vol.63 (1), p.292-307
issn 0899-8256
1090-2473
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36872537
source Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete - AutoHoldings; RePEc
subjects Bargaining
Deviation
Economic behaviour
Game theory
Preferences
Studies
title Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-09T13%3A12%3A49IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Subgame%20perfection%20in%20ultimatum%20bargaining%20trees&rft.jtitle=Games%20and%20economic%20behavior&rft.au=Stahl,%20Dale%20O.&rft.date=2008-05-01&rft.volume=63&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=292&rft.epage=307&rft.pages=292-307&rft.issn=0899-8256&rft.eissn=1090-2473&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.003&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E1464724721%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=197176580&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S0899825607001431&rfr_iscdi=true