Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage

Maskin and Tirole [Maskin, E., Tirole, J., 1999. Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83–114] show that indescribability does not matter for contractual incompleteness when there is symmetric information both at the contracting stage and at the trading s...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economics letters 2008-05, Vol.99 (2), p.367-370
1. Verfasser:	Kunimoto, Takashi
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Asymmetric information Contracts Financial incentives Incentive compatibility Incomplete contracts Indescribability Individual rationality Rationality
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description	Maskin and Tirole [Maskin, E., Tirole, J., 1999. Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83–114] show that indescribability does not matter for contractual incompleteness when there is symmetric information both at the contracting stage and at the trading stage. Following their setup, I show that with asymmetric information at both stages, indescribability can matter.
doi_str_mv	10.1016/j.econlet.2007.08.007
format	Article
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source	RePEc; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present)
subjects	Asymmetric information Contracts Financial incentives Incentive compatibility Incomplete contracts Indescribability Individual rationality Rationality
title	Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage
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