Do Federal Home Loan Bank membership and advances increase bank risk-taking?

Since the early 1990s, commercial banks have turned to Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) advances to plug the gap between loan and deposit growth. Is this trend worrisome? On the one hand, advances implicitly encourage risk by insulating borrowers from market discipline. On the other, advances give b...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of banking & finance 2008-05, Vol.32 (5), p.680-698
Hauptverfasser: Stojanovic, Dusan, Vaughan, Mark D., Yeager, Timothy J.
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container_title Journal of banking & finance
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creator Stojanovic, Dusan
Vaughan, Mark D.
Yeager, Timothy J.
description Since the early 1990s, commercial banks have turned to Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) advances to plug the gap between loan and deposit growth. Is this trend worrisome? On the one hand, advances implicitly encourage risk by insulating borrowers from market discipline. On the other, advances give borrowers greater flexibility to managing interest rate and liquidity risk. And access to FHLBank funding encourages members to reshape their balance sheets in ways that could lower credit risk. Using quarterly financial and supervisory data for banks from 1992 to 2005, we assess the effect of FHLBank membership and advances on risk. The evidence suggests liquidity and leverage risks rose modestly, but interest-rate risk declined somewhat. Credit risk and overall failure risk were largely unaffected. Although the evidence suggest FHLBank membership and advances have had, at best, only a modest impact on bank risk, we caution that our sample period constitutes one observation and that moral hazard could be pronounced if leverage ratios revert to historical norms.
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identifier ISSN: 0378-4266
ispartof Journal of banking & finance, 2008-05, Vol.32 (5), p.680-698
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language eng
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source RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete
subjects Bank liquidity
Bank operations
Bank risk
Commercial banks
Credit market
Credit risk
Federal Home Loan Bank
Financial risks
Government-sponsored enterprises
Home loans
Interest rates
Liquidity
Liquidity management
Market discipline
Memberships
Risk management
Studies
U.S.A
title Do Federal Home Loan Bank membership and advances increase bank risk-taking?
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