Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189–206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, F., 2001. Evolutionary d...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 2008-03, Vol.62 (2), p.610-627
1. Verfasser:	Norman, Thomas W.L.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Continuous strategy spaces Dynamics Economic stability Economic theory Evolutionary economics Evolutionary stability Game theory Replicator dynamics Stable sets Strategic behaviour Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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