Strategic Actions and Credit Spreads: An Empirical Investigation

Do strategic actions of borrowers and lenders affect corporate debt values? We find higher bond spreads for firms that can renegotiate debt contracts relatively easily. Consistent with theories of strategic debt service, the threat of strategic default depresses bond values ex ante, even though ther...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of finance (New York) 2007-12, Vol.62 (6), p.2633-2671
Hauptverfasser: DAVYDENKO, SERGEI A., STREBULAEV, ILYA A.
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creator DAVYDENKO, SERGEI A.
STREBULAEV, ILYA A.
description Do strategic actions of borrowers and lenders affect corporate debt values? We find higher bond spreads for firms that can renegotiate debt contracts relatively easily. Consistent with theories of strategic debt service, the threat of strategic default depresses bond values ex ante, even though there may be efficiency gains from renegotiation ex post. However, the economic significance of the net effect is small, suggesting that bondholders have considerable bargaining power. The effect of strategic actions is higher when creditors are particularly vulnerable to strategic threats, including risky firms with high managerial shareholding, simple debt structures, and high liquidation costs.
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source Jstor Complete Legacy; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete
subjects Bargaining power
Bond issues
Bonds
Borrowing
Chief executive officers
Corporate bonds
Corporate debt
Corporate finance
Creditors
Debt
Debt management
Debt service
Financial engineering
Financial leverage
Public debt
Risk
Short term debt
Spread
Strategic behaviour
Strategic default
Studies
Yield curves
title Strategic Actions and Credit Spreads: An Empirical Investigation
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