Trusted Markets: The Exchanges of Islamic Companies

In recent years, Turkey has witnessed a new form of corporate finance in which companies, commonly called ‘Islamic’, borrow directly from lenders without using any financial intermediaries. Trust among lenders and borrowers has initiated market exchange, secured deals and lowered transaction costs....

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Veröffentlicht in:Comparative economic studies 2006-03, Vol.48 (1), p.132-155
Hauptverfasser: Ozcan, Gul Berna, Cokgezen, Murat
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description In recent years, Turkey has witnessed a new form of corporate finance in which companies, commonly called ‘Islamic’, borrow directly from lenders without using any financial intermediaries. Trust among lenders and borrowers has initiated market exchange, secured deals and lowered transaction costs. This paper claims that the base of trust in direct financing for Islamic companies should be largely attributed to the self-interest of the parties rather than just to Islam or ‘shared values’. Here we do not see an individual calculation of ‘economic man’, as argued by neo-classical economists, but individuals embedded in relations within social groups and sharing ethics of money-based relations. Second, we illustrate that self-interest based trust stems from the calculations of trusters using available information in the market about trustees. However, information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders in favour of borrowers has been a source of deep instability and abuse. Finally, the paper shows how groups have used the rhetoric of Islamic economic revival to expand the scope of transactions while trust eroded in favour of abusers. The anonymity came with thousands of investors who eroded the strength of reciprocity, surveillance and retribution in trust-based relations. This case study also illustrates that Islamic societies seek new solutions within capitalist economic systems to maximise their gains and they do not wish to be destined to live in poverty.
doi_str_mv 10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100073
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subjects A10
A14
Access to credit
Adverse selection
Analysis
Borrowing
Case studies
Corporate finance
Cost control
Economic theory
Economics
Economics and Finance
Financial economics
Financial institutions
Financial intermediaries
G14
International aspects
International Economics
Investments
Islam
Islamic economics
Islamic financing
Massachusetts trusts
Morality
Muslims
O10
O14
P14
P52
Political Economy/Economic Systems
Poverty
Religious aspects
Secured transactions
Self interest
Social impact
Studies
Surveillance
Transaction costs
Trust
Z12
title Trusted Markets: The Exchanges of Islamic Companies
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