Coalitions, agreements and efficiency

If agents negotiate openly and form coalitions, can they reach efficient agreements? We address this issue within a class of coalition formation games with externalities where agents’ preferences depend solely on the coalition structure they are associated with. We derive Ray and Vohra's [Equil...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic theory 2007-09, Vol.136 (1), p.105-125
Hauptverfasser:	Diamantoudi, Effrosyni, Xue, Licun
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agreements Coalition formation Coalitions Decision theory Economic efficiency Economic psychology Economic theory Efficiency Externalities Game theory Group decision making Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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