Bertrand games and sharing rules
We consider asymmetric Bertrand games with arbitrary payoffs at ties or sharing rules, and identify sufficient conditions for the zero-profit outcome and the existence of Nash equilibria. Subject to some technical conditions on non-tied payoffs the following hold. If the sharing rule is strictly tie...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economic theory 2007-06, Vol.31 (3), p.573-585 |
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| container_title | Economic theory |
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| creator | Hoernig, Steffen H. |
| description | We consider asymmetric Bertrand games with arbitrary payoffs at ties or sharing rules, and identify sufficient conditions for the zero-profit outcome and the existence of Nash equilibria. Subject to some technical conditions on non-tied payoffs the following hold. If the sharing rule is strictly tie-decreasing all players but one receive zero equilibrium payoffs, while everybody does so if non-tied payoffs are symmetric. Mixed (pure) strategy Nash equilibria exist if the sharing rule is (norm) tie-decreasing and coalition-monotone. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00199-006-0112-8 |
| format | Article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0938-2259 |
| ispartof | Economic theory, 2007-06, Vol.31 (3), p.573-585 |
| issn | 0938-2259 1432-0479 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Constant returns to scale Decreasing returns Duopolies Economic models Economic theory Equilibrium Equilibrium existence conditions Game theory Games Imperfect competition Industrial organization Marginal costs Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Oligopolies Oligopoly Payoffs Profit sharing Studies Urelements |
| title | Bertrand games and sharing rules |
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