Export restraints in a model of trade with capital accumulation

This paper examines the impact of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in an international duopoly modeled as a differential game. With a Ramsey capital accumulation dynamics, the game admits multiple steady states, and a VER cannot be ‘voluntarily’ employed by the foreign firm in case of Cournot beha...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic dynamics & control 2007-12, Vol.31 (12), p.3822-3842
Hauptverfasser:	Calzolari, Giacomo, Lambertini, Luca
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Capital accumulation Differential games Duopoly Economic models Exports Game theory Games Industry Intra-industry trade Studies Trade policy
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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