Investor protection and the Coasian view
The corporate charters of a sample of Mexican firms show that private firms often significantly enhance the legal protection offered to investors, but public firms rarely do so. We construct a model that endogenizes the degree of investor protection that firms provide, using as a springboard the ass...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of financial economics 2007-06, Vol.84 (3), p.738-771 |
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| container_end_page | 771 |
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| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 738 |
| container_title | Journal of financial economics |
| container_volume | 84 |
| creator | Bergman, Nittai K. Nicolaievsky, Daniel |
| description | The corporate charters of a sample of Mexican firms show that private firms often significantly enhance the legal protection offered to investors, but public firms rarely do so. We construct a model that endogenizes the degree of investor protection that firms provide, using as a springboard the assumption that legal regimes differ in their ability to enforce
precisely filtering contracts that provide protection only in those cases where expropriation can occur. Our model generates predictions about the types of contracts that would be employed and the levels of investor protection that would prevail across different legal regimes in both private and public firms. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.11.003 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0304-405X |
| ispartof | Journal of financial economics, 2007-06, Vol.84 (3), p.738-771 |
| issn | 0304-405X 1879-2774 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36631858 |
| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Business models Charters Comparative analysis Contracts Corporate charters Corporate governance Financial contracting Investor protection Investors Legal protection Mexico Private enterprises Protection Public sector Studies |
| title | Investor protection and the Coasian view |
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