CEO incentives, innovation, and performance in technology-intensive firms: a reconciliation of outcome and behavior-based incentive schemes
Building on the agency view of corporate governance, we propose that technology-intensive firms use both outcome and behavior-based performance criteria for rewarding CEOs. Using a sample of 206 firms from 12 U.S. manufacturing industries, we find that as technological intensity increases CEO bonuse...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Strategic management journal 2006-11, Vol.27 (11), p.1057-1080 |
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creator | Makri, Marianna Lane, Peter J. Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. |
description | Building on the agency view of corporate governance, we propose that technology-intensive firms use both outcome and behavior-based performance criteria for rewarding CEOs. Using a sample of 206 firms from 12 U.S. manufacturing industries, we find that as technological intensity increases CEO bonuses are more closely linked to financial results and that total CEO incentives are associated with two indicators of desirable innovation behaviors: invention resonance and science harvesting. Invention resonance refers to the impact a firm's inventions have on other firms' inventions, while science harvesting reflects a firm's commitment to scientific research. As technological intensity increases, aligning bonus with financial results, total incentives with invention resonance, and total incentives with science harvesting predict firm market performance. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1002/smj.560 |
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Mgmt. J</addtitle><date>2006-11</date><risdate>2006</risdate><volume>27</volume><issue>11</issue><spage>1057</spage><epage>1080</epage><pages>1057-1080</pages><issn>0143-2095</issn><eissn>1097-0266</eissn><coden>SMAJD8</coden><abstract>Building on the agency view of corporate governance, we propose that technology-intensive firms use both outcome and behavior-based performance criteria for rewarding CEOs. Using a sample of 206 firms from 12 U.S. manufacturing industries, we find that as technological intensity increases CEO bonuses are more closely linked to financial results and that total CEO incentives are associated with two indicators of desirable innovation behaviors: invention resonance and science harvesting. Invention resonance refers to the impact a firm's inventions have on other firms' inventions, while science harvesting reflects a firm's commitment to scientific research. As technological intensity increases, aligning bonus with financial results, total incentives with invention resonance, and total incentives with science harvesting predict firm market performance.</abstract><cop>Chichester, UK</cop><pub>John Wiley & Sons, Ltd</pub><doi>10.1002/smj.560</doi><tpages>24</tpages></addata></record> |
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source | JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Wiley Online Library All Journals |
subjects | Business innovation Business structures Chief executive officers Corporate governance Corporate strategies Correlation analysis Educational innovation Empirical research Executive compensation Financial performance History of technology Incentives innovation Intellectual property Inventions Job performance Management science Organizational behaviour Pay for performance science Studies Technological change Technological innovation technology U.S.A Wage incentives |
title | CEO incentives, innovation, and performance in technology-intensive firms: a reconciliation of outcome and behavior-based incentive schemes |
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