Bidder CEO and Other Executive Compensation in UK M&As
This paper investigates the impact of M&As on bidder (CEO and other) executive compensation employing a unique sample of 100 completed bids in the UK over the 1998–2001 period. Our findings indicate that less independent and larger boards award CEOs significantly higher bonuses and salary follow...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | European financial management : the journal of the European Financial Management Association 2006-09, Vol.12 (4), p.609-631 |
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| container_title | European financial management : the journal of the European Financial Management Association |
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| creator | Coakley, Jerry Iliopoulou, Stavroula |
| description | This paper investigates the impact of M&As on bidder (CEO and other) executive compensation employing a unique sample of 100 completed bids in the UK over the 1998–2001 period. Our findings indicate that less independent and larger boards award CEOs significantly higher bonuses and salary following M&A completion both for the full sample and for the UK and US sub‐samples. UK CEOs and executives are rewarded more for the effort exerted in accomplishing intra‐industry or large mergers than for diversifying or small mergers and their cash pay is unaffected by other measures of their managerial skill or performance. US bidders are rewarded at higher levels than their UK counterparts and their remuneration is related only to measures of CEO dominance over the board of directors. Overall our findings offer support for the managerial power rather than the agency theory perspective on managerial compensation. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2006.00333.x |
| format | Article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 1354-7798 |
| ispartof | European financial management : the journal of the European Financial Management Association, 2006-09, Vol.12 (4), p.609-631 |
| issn | 1354-7798 1468-036X |
| language | eng |
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| source | Wiley Journals; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Acquisitions Acquisitions & mergers Agency theory Bidding Business studies Chief executive officers Correlation analysis Data analysis Earnings Executive compensation G34 Impact analysis J33 managerial power Mergers Principal-agent theory Senior management Studies U.S.A United Kingdom Wages & salaries |
| title | Bidder CEO and Other Executive Compensation in UK M&As |
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