Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information. If there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers, and their bids are restricted to a suffici...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Econometrica 2006-09, Vol.74 (5), p.1231-1269 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 1269 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 5 |
| container_start_page | 1231 |
| container_title | Econometrica |
| container_volume | 74 |
| creator | Reny, Philip J Perry, Motty |
| description | A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information. If there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers, and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices, then, generically, there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents. In particular, the large double-auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents' information. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00703.x |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36518279</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>3805924</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>3805924</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c5223-a7f502897414cc4ddc86662f26591c0745397e3d9155befeca62836cedf9f8623</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNkM1q3DAUhU1poNMkb9CFKbQ7u1eS9bfoIjWTSUvaQjMhS6HIcpHrGU0km0zePvI4TKGrCoGuON85cE-W5QhKlM6nrkQVEwVghksMwEoADqTcv8oWR-F1tgBAuJBM4DfZ2xg7AKDpLrJ67R91aHKd3wxBD_a3M_mlH7eNHpzf5q0P-a_DqPt8ud9ZMxx-MV8-jK5398GNm7PspNV9tOcv72l2e7lc11fF9c_V1_riujAUY1Jo3lLAQvIKVcZUTWMEYwy3mFGJDPCKEsktaSSi9N621miGBWHGNq1sBcPkNPs45-6CfxhtHNTGRWP7Xm-tH6MijCKBuUzg-3_Azo8hrRAVBiIkRWSCxAyZ4GMMtlW74DY6PCkEaqpWdWpqUE0NqqladahW7ZP1w0u-jkb3bdBb4-JfvwAhKGGJ-zxzj663T_-dr5b1-iJNyf9u9ndx8OHoJwKoxFWSi1l2cbD7o6zDH8U44VTd_Vip79_46orBF1WTZ1cOozc</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>203895139</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium</title><source>Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete</source><source>JSTOR Mathematics & Statistics</source><source>Jstor Complete Legacy</source><creator>Reny, Philip J ; Perry, Motty</creator><creatorcontrib>Reny, Philip J ; Perry, Motty</creatorcontrib><description>A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information. If there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers, and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices, then, generically, there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents. In particular, the large double-auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents' information.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0012-9682</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1468-0262</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00703.x</identifier><identifier>CODEN: ECMTA7</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><subject>Applications ; Auction markets ; Auctions ; Bidding ; Bids ; double auction ; Economic agents ; Economic equilibrium ; Economic expectations ; Economic models ; Equilibrium ; equilibrium existence ; Equilibrium theory ; Exact sciences and technology ; Information aggregation ; Insurance, economics, finance ; Market equilibrium ; Market prices ; Market theory ; Mathematics ; monotone pure strategy ; Probability and statistics ; Rational expectations ; Rational expectations theory ; Rationing ; Sciences and techniques of general use ; Statistics ; Studies ; Trade</subject><ispartof>Econometrica, 2006-09, Vol.74 (5), p.1231-1269</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2006 The Econometric Society</rights><rights>2006 INIST-CNRS</rights><rights>Copyright Blackwell Publishing Sep 2006</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c5223-a7f502897414cc4ddc86662f26591c0745397e3d9155befeca62836cedf9f8623</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c5223-a7f502897414cc4ddc86662f26591c0745397e3d9155befeca62836cedf9f8623</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3805924$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/3805924$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,828,1411,27903,27904,45553,45554,57995,57999,58228,58232</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=18088536$$DView record in Pascal Francis$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Reny, Philip J</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Perry, Motty</creatorcontrib><title>Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium</title><title>Econometrica</title><description>A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information. If there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers, and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices, then, generically, there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents. In particular, the large double-auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents' information.</description><subject>Applications</subject><subject>Auction markets</subject><subject>Auctions</subject><subject>Bidding</subject><subject>Bids</subject><subject>double auction</subject><subject>Economic agents</subject><subject>Economic equilibrium</subject><subject>Economic expectations</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>equilibrium existence</subject><subject>Equilibrium theory</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>Information aggregation</subject><subject>Insurance, economics, finance</subject><subject>Market equilibrium</subject><subject>Market prices</subject><subject>Market theory</subject><subject>Mathematics</subject><subject>monotone pure strategy</subject><subject>Probability and statistics</subject><subject>Rational expectations</subject><subject>Rational expectations theory</subject><subject>Rationing</subject><subject>Sciences and techniques of general use</subject><subject>Statistics</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Trade</subject><issn>0012-9682</issn><issn>1468-0262</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2006</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqNkM1q3DAUhU1poNMkb9CFKbQ7u1eS9bfoIjWTSUvaQjMhS6HIcpHrGU0km0zePvI4TKGrCoGuON85cE-W5QhKlM6nrkQVEwVghksMwEoADqTcv8oWR-F1tgBAuJBM4DfZ2xg7AKDpLrJ67R91aHKd3wxBD_a3M_mlH7eNHpzf5q0P-a_DqPt8ud9ZMxx-MV8-jK5398GNm7PspNV9tOcv72l2e7lc11fF9c_V1_riujAUY1Jo3lLAQvIKVcZUTWMEYwy3mFGJDPCKEsktaSSi9N621miGBWHGNq1sBcPkNPs45-6CfxhtHNTGRWP7Xm-tH6MijCKBuUzg-3_Azo8hrRAVBiIkRWSCxAyZ4GMMtlW74DY6PCkEaqpWdWpqUE0NqqladahW7ZP1w0u-jkb3bdBb4-JfvwAhKGGJ-zxzj663T_-dr5b1-iJNyf9u9ndx8OHoJwKoxFWSi1l2cbD7o6zDH8U44VTd_Vip79_46orBF1WTZ1cOozc</recordid><startdate>200609</startdate><enddate>200609</enddate><creator>Reny, Philip J</creator><creator>Perry, Motty</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><general>Econometric Society</general><general>Blackwell</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>IQODW</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200609</creationdate><title>Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium</title><author>Reny, Philip J ; Perry, Motty</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c5223-a7f502897414cc4ddc86662f26591c0745397e3d9155befeca62836cedf9f8623</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2006</creationdate><topic>Applications</topic><topic>Auction markets</topic><topic>Auctions</topic><topic>Bidding</topic><topic>Bids</topic><topic>double auction</topic><topic>Economic agents</topic><topic>Economic equilibrium</topic><topic>Economic expectations</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>equilibrium existence</topic><topic>Equilibrium theory</topic><topic>Exact sciences and technology</topic><topic>Information aggregation</topic><topic>Insurance, economics, finance</topic><topic>Market equilibrium</topic><topic>Market prices</topic><topic>Market theory</topic><topic>Mathematics</topic><topic>monotone pure strategy</topic><topic>Probability and statistics</topic><topic>Rational expectations</topic><topic>Rational expectations theory</topic><topic>Rationing</topic><topic>Sciences and techniques of general use</topic><topic>Statistics</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Trade</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Reny, Philip J</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Perry, Motty</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Econometrica</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Reny, Philip J</au><au>Perry, Motty</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium</atitle><jtitle>Econometrica</jtitle><date>2006-09</date><risdate>2006</risdate><volume>74</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>1231</spage><epage>1269</epage><pages>1231-1269</pages><issn>0012-9682</issn><eissn>1468-0262</eissn><coden>ECMTA7</coden><abstract>A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information. If there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers, and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices, then, generically, there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents. In particular, the large double-auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents' information.</abstract><cop>Oxford, UK</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00703.x</doi><tpages>39</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0012-9682 |
| ispartof | Econometrica, 2006-09, Vol.74 (5), p.1231-1269 |
| issn | 0012-9682 1468-0262 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36518279 |
| source | Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; JSTOR Mathematics & Statistics; Jstor Complete Legacy |
| subjects | Applications Auction markets Auctions Bidding Bids double auction Economic agents Economic equilibrium Economic expectations Economic models Equilibrium equilibrium existence Equilibrium theory Exact sciences and technology Information aggregation Insurance, economics, finance Market equilibrium Market prices Market theory Mathematics monotone pure strategy Probability and statistics Rational expectations Rational expectations theory Rationing Sciences and techniques of general use Statistics Studies Trade |
| title | Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-24T22%3A58%3A46IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Toward%20a%20Strategic%20Foundation%20for%20Rational%20Expectations%20Equilibrium&rft.jtitle=Econometrica&rft.au=Reny,%20Philip%20J&rft.date=2006-09&rft.volume=74&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=1231&rft.epage=1269&rft.pages=1231-1269&rft.issn=0012-9682&rft.eissn=1468-0262&rft.coden=ECMTA7&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00703.x&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E3805924%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=203895139&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=3805924&rfr_iscdi=true |