Corporate Governance and Development
The literature shows that good corporate governance generally pays—for firms, for markets, and for countries. It is associated with a lower cost of capital, higher returns on equity, greater efficiency, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders, although the direction of causality is not alwa...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The World Bank research observer 2006-04, Vol.21 (1), p.91-122 |
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| container_end_page | 122 |
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| container_title | The World Bank research observer |
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| creator | Claessens, Stijn |
| description | The literature shows that good corporate governance generally pays—for firms, for markets, and for countries. It is associated with a lower cost of capital, higher returns on equity, greater efficiency, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders, although the direction of causality is not always clear. The law and finance literature has documented the important role of institutions aimed at contractual and legal enforcement, including corporate governance, across countries. Using firm-level data, researchers have documented relationships between countries’ corporate governance frameworks on the one hand and performance, valuation, the cost of capital, and access to external financing on the other. Given the benefits of good corporate governance, firms and countries should voluntarily reform more. Resistance by entrenched owners and managers at the firm level and political economy factors at the level of markets and countries partly explain why they do not. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/wbro/lkj004 |
| format | Article |
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It is associated with a lower cost of capital, higher returns on equity, greater efficiency, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders, although the direction of causality is not always clear. The law and finance literature has documented the important role of institutions aimed at contractual and legal enforcement, including corporate governance, across countries. Using firm-level data, researchers have documented relationships between countries’ corporate governance frameworks on the one hand and performance, valuation, the cost of capital, and access to external financing on the other. Given the benefits of good corporate governance, firms and countries should voluntarily reform more. Resistance by entrenched owners and managers at the firm level and political economy factors at the level of markets and countries partly explain why they do not.</description><subject>Bankruptcy laws</subject><subject>Behavior</subject><subject>Business organization and administration</subject><subject>Business structures</subject><subject>Capital costs</subject><subject>Capital investments</subject><subject>Corporate governance</subject><subject>Correlation analysis</subject><subject>COST OF CAPITAL</subject><subject>Economic development</subject><subject>Enterprises</subject><subject>Executive compensation</subject><subject>EXTERNAL FINANCING</subject><subject>Financial economics</subject><subject>Financial investments</subject><subject>GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE</subject><subject>Institutional investments</subject><subject>Institutions</subject><subject>International aspects</subject><subject>International finance</subject><subject>Investors</subject><subject>LEGAL ENFORCEMENT</subject><subject>Management</subject><subject>Observational research</subject><subject>Political conditions</subject><subject>POLITICAL ECONOMY</subject><subject>Private property</subject><subject>Property rights</subject><subject>Reform</subject><subject>RETURNS ON EQUITY</subject><subject>Shareholders</subject><subject>Social responsibility</subject><subject>Stockholders</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>TREATMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS</subject><subject>Valuation</subject><subject>World 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development</topic><topic>Enterprises</topic><topic>Executive compensation</topic><topic>EXTERNAL FINANCING</topic><topic>Financial economics</topic><topic>Financial investments</topic><topic>GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE</topic><topic>Institutional investments</topic><topic>Institutions</topic><topic>International aspects</topic><topic>International finance</topic><topic>Investors</topic><topic>LEGAL ENFORCEMENT</topic><topic>Management</topic><topic>Observational research</topic><topic>Political conditions</topic><topic>POLITICAL ECONOMY</topic><topic>Private property</topic><topic>Property rights</topic><topic>Reform</topic><topic>RETURNS ON EQUITY</topic><topic>Shareholders</topic><topic>Social responsibility</topic><topic>Stockholders</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>TREATMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS</topic><topic>Valuation</topic><topic>World Bank</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Claessens, Stijn</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>Open 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| ispartof | The World Bank research observer, 2006-04, Vol.21 (1), p.91-122 |
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| source | PAIS Index; Open Knowledge Repository; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current); EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals |
| subjects | Bankruptcy laws Behavior Business organization and administration Business structures Capital costs Capital investments Corporate governance Correlation analysis COST OF CAPITAL Economic development Enterprises Executive compensation EXTERNAL FINANCING Financial economics Financial investments GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Institutional investments Institutions International aspects International finance Investors LEGAL ENFORCEMENT Management Observational research Political conditions POLITICAL ECONOMY Private property Property rights Reform RETURNS ON EQUITY Shareholders Social responsibility Stockholders Studies TREATMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS Valuation World Bank |
| title | Corporate Governance and Development |
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