The strategy of professional forecasting

We develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters’ strategic behavior. The first theory, reputational cheap talk, posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed. The market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the rea...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of financial economics 2006-08, Vol.81 (2), p.441-466
Hauptverfasser:	Ottaviani, Marco, Sørensen, Peter Norman
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Cheap talk Contest Economic behaviour Exaggeration Forecasting Forecasts Reputation Reputations Strategic behaviour Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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