Redistribution, taxes, and the median voter

We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identica...

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Veröffentlicht in:Review of economic dynamics 2006-04, Vol.9 (2), p.211-223
Hauptverfasser: Bassetto, Marco, Benhabib, Jess
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container_title Review of economic dynamics
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creator Bassetto, Marco
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description We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the “bang-bang” property.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.red.2006.02.001
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source Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals
subjects Capital income taxes
Capital returns
Economic models
Fiscal policy
Gorman aggregation
Income redistribution
Income tax
Income taxes
Mathematical methods
Median voter
Political economy
Redistribution
Studies
Voters
Voting behaviour
title Redistribution, taxes, and the median voter
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