Dutch Industrial Companies and the German Occupation, 1940–1945

In this article, the question will be what consequence the internal German power relations had for the German economic policy and what results this in its turn had for Dutch industry. After a description of that industry in 1940, it will be argued that in the first 18 months of the occupation the fa...

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Veröffentlicht in:Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2006-01, Vol.93 (1), p.1-22
1. Verfasser: Klemann, Hein A. M
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description In this article, the question will be what consequence the internal German power relations had for the German economic policy and what results this in its turn had for Dutch industry. After a description of that industry in 1940, it will be argued that in the first 18 months of the occupation the fact that Seyss-Inquart had orders to win the Dutch for a national-socialistic future protected the country from an unscrupulous exploitation by Göring. Seyss’ policy even resulted in a short, but remarkable industrial boom. The internal German struggle of 1941/42 for power over the economy, and ideas about a more systematic exploitation to maximize the war effort, ended this boom. It resulted not only for the occupied economies of Western Europe in destructive policy of Speer and Sauckel, but also in the de facto transfer of power over the Dutch economy from The Hague to Berlin. Seyss-Inquart could not prevent anymore that the Dutch were exploited. This meant that his mission, that never had much chance, became a complete failure.
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source JSTOR Business III; JSTOR Arts & Sciences IX
subjects Business structures
Economic conditions
Economic exploitation
Economic policy
Foreign occupation
Germany
Industrial economics
Industrial enterprises
Industrial production
Nazism
Netherlands
Policy analysis
Power relations
Raw materials
VSWG 2006, 1
War economics
Workforce
World War Two
title Dutch Industrial Companies and the German Occupation, 1940–1945
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