Dutch Industrial Companies and the German Occupation, 1940–1945
In this article, the question will be what consequence the internal German power relations had for the German economic policy and what results this in its turn had for Dutch industry. After a description of that industry in 1940, it will be argued that in the first 18 months of the occupation the fa...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2006-01, Vol.93 (1), p.1-22 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 22 |
---|---|
container_issue | 1 |
container_start_page | 1 |
container_title | Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte |
container_volume | 93 |
creator | Klemann, Hein A. M |
description | In this article, the question will be what consequence the internal German power relations had for the German economic policy and what results this in its turn had for Dutch industry. After a description of that industry in 1940, it will be argued that in the first 18 months of the occupation the fact that Seyss-Inquart had orders to win the Dutch for a national-socialistic future protected the country from an unscrupulous exploitation by Göring. Seyss’ policy even resulted in a short, but remarkable industrial boom. The internal German struggle of 1941/42 for power over the economy, and ideas about a more systematic exploitation to maximize the war effort, ended this boom. It resulted not only for the occupied economies of Western Europe in destructive policy of Speer and Sauckel, but also in the de facto transfer of power over the Dutch economy from The Hague to Berlin. Seyss-Inquart could not prevent anymore that the Dutch were exploited. This meant that his mission, that never had much chance, became a complete failure. |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36450817</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>20741782</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>20741782</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-f277t-5d1db699c93ed1c4e30d20c71e8608bd3867160733919e96414f5945480de55c3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpFjM1KAzEYRQdRsNQ-gpCVqw58-U-WpWotFLrR9ZAmGTsykxmTjKIr38E39EkcqODichbncM-KGaGClwRTcV7MgDIolSTqslik1ByAUCoIlmJWrG7HbI9oG9yYcmxMi9Z9N5jQ-IRMcCgfPdr42JmA9taOg8lNH5YIawY_X98T-FVxUZs2-cUf58XT_d3j-qHc7Tfb9WpX1kTKXHKH3UFobTX1DlvmKTgCVmKvBKiDo0pILEBSqrH2WjDMaj7dMwXOc27pvLg5_Q6xfx19ylXXJOvb1gTfj6mignFQWE7h9Sl8SbmP1RCbzsSPioBkWCoy-eXJ19GEz5R9E_x_9pbenwmAAAwwDdNfix9fPg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>36450817</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Dutch Industrial Companies and the German Occupation, 1940–1945</title><source>JSTOR Business III</source><source>JSTOR Arts & Sciences IX</source><creator>Klemann, Hein A. M</creator><creatorcontrib>Klemann, Hein A. M</creatorcontrib><description>In this article, the question will be what consequence the internal German power relations had for the German economic policy and what results this in its turn had for Dutch industry. After a description of that industry in 1940, it will be argued that in the first 18 months of the occupation the fact that Seyss-Inquart had orders to win the Dutch for a national-socialistic future protected the country from an unscrupulous exploitation by Göring. Seyss’ policy even resulted in a short, but remarkable industrial boom. The internal German struggle of 1941/42 for power over the economy, and ideas about a more systematic exploitation to maximize the war effort, ended this boom. It resulted not only for the occupied economies of Western Europe in destructive policy of Speer and Sauckel, but also in the de facto transfer of power over the Dutch economy from The Hague to Berlin. Seyss-Inquart could not prevent anymore that the Dutch were exploited. This meant that his mission, that never had much chance, became a complete failure.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0340-8728</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2365-2136</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Franz Steiner Verlag</publisher><subject>Business structures ; Economic conditions ; Economic exploitation ; Economic policy ; Foreign occupation ; Germany ; Industrial economics ; Industrial enterprises ; Industrial production ; Nazism ; Netherlands ; Policy analysis ; Power relations ; Raw materials ; VSWG 2006, 1 ; War economics ; Workforce ; World War Two</subject><ispartof>Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 2006-01, Vol.93 (1), p.1-22</ispartof><rights>2006 Franz Steiner Verlag</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20741782$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/20741782$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,851,855,58008,58009,58241,58242</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Klemann, Hein A. M</creatorcontrib><title>Dutch Industrial Companies and the German Occupation, 1940–1945</title><title>Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte</title><addtitle>VSWG</addtitle><description>In this article, the question will be what consequence the internal German power relations had for the German economic policy and what results this in its turn had for Dutch industry. After a description of that industry in 1940, it will be argued that in the first 18 months of the occupation the fact that Seyss-Inquart had orders to win the Dutch for a national-socialistic future protected the country from an unscrupulous exploitation by Göring. Seyss’ policy even resulted in a short, but remarkable industrial boom. The internal German struggle of 1941/42 for power over the economy, and ideas about a more systematic exploitation to maximize the war effort, ended this boom. It resulted not only for the occupied economies of Western Europe in destructive policy of Speer and Sauckel, but also in the de facto transfer of power over the Dutch economy from The Hague to Berlin. Seyss-Inquart could not prevent anymore that the Dutch were exploited. This meant that his mission, that never had much chance, became a complete failure.</description><subject>Business structures</subject><subject>Economic conditions</subject><subject>Economic exploitation</subject><subject>Economic policy</subject><subject>Foreign occupation</subject><subject>Germany</subject><subject>Industrial economics</subject><subject>Industrial enterprises</subject><subject>Industrial production</subject><subject>Nazism</subject><subject>Netherlands</subject><subject>Policy analysis</subject><subject>Power relations</subject><subject>Raw materials</subject><subject>VSWG 2006, 1</subject><subject>War economics</subject><subject>Workforce</subject><subject>World War Two</subject><issn>0340-8728</issn><issn>2365-2136</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2006</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpFjM1KAzEYRQdRsNQ-gpCVqw58-U-WpWotFLrR9ZAmGTsykxmTjKIr38E39EkcqODichbncM-KGaGClwRTcV7MgDIolSTqslik1ByAUCoIlmJWrG7HbI9oG9yYcmxMi9Z9N5jQ-IRMcCgfPdr42JmA9taOg8lNH5YIawY_X98T-FVxUZs2-cUf58XT_d3j-qHc7Tfb9WpX1kTKXHKH3UFobTX1DlvmKTgCVmKvBKiDo0pILEBSqrH2WjDMaj7dMwXOc27pvLg5_Q6xfx19ylXXJOvb1gTfj6mignFQWE7h9Sl8SbmP1RCbzsSPioBkWCoy-eXJ19GEz5R9E_x_9pbenwmAAAwwDdNfix9fPg</recordid><startdate>20060101</startdate><enddate>20060101</enddate><creator>Klemann, Hein A. M</creator><general>Franz Steiner Verlag</general><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20060101</creationdate><title>Dutch Industrial Companies and the German Occupation, 1940–1945</title><author>Klemann, Hein A. M</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-f277t-5d1db699c93ed1c4e30d20c71e8608bd3867160733919e96414f5945480de55c3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2006</creationdate><topic>Business structures</topic><topic>Economic conditions</topic><topic>Economic exploitation</topic><topic>Economic policy</topic><topic>Foreign occupation</topic><topic>Germany</topic><topic>Industrial economics</topic><topic>Industrial enterprises</topic><topic>Industrial production</topic><topic>Nazism</topic><topic>Netherlands</topic><topic>Policy analysis</topic><topic>Power relations</topic><topic>Raw materials</topic><topic>VSWG 2006, 1</topic><topic>War economics</topic><topic>Workforce</topic><topic>World War Two</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Klemann, Hein A. M</creatorcontrib><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Klemann, Hein A. M</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Dutch Industrial Companies and the German Occupation, 1940–1945</atitle><jtitle>Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte</jtitle><addtitle>VSWG</addtitle><date>2006-01-01</date><risdate>2006</risdate><volume>93</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>22</epage><pages>1-22</pages><issn>0340-8728</issn><eissn>2365-2136</eissn><abstract>In this article, the question will be what consequence the internal German power relations had for the German economic policy and what results this in its turn had for Dutch industry. After a description of that industry in 1940, it will be argued that in the first 18 months of the occupation the fact that Seyss-Inquart had orders to win the Dutch for a national-socialistic future protected the country from an unscrupulous exploitation by Göring. Seyss’ policy even resulted in a short, but remarkable industrial boom. The internal German struggle of 1941/42 for power over the economy, and ideas about a more systematic exploitation to maximize the war effort, ended this boom. It resulted not only for the occupied economies of Western Europe in destructive policy of Speer and Sauckel, but also in the de facto transfer of power over the Dutch economy from The Hague to Berlin. Seyss-Inquart could not prevent anymore that the Dutch were exploited. This meant that his mission, that never had much chance, became a complete failure.</abstract><pub>Franz Steiner Verlag</pub><tpages>22</tpages></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 0340-8728 |
ispartof | Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 2006-01, Vol.93 (1), p.1-22 |
issn | 0340-8728 2365-2136 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36450817 |
source | JSTOR Business III; JSTOR Arts & Sciences IX |
subjects | Business structures Economic conditions Economic exploitation Economic policy Foreign occupation Germany Industrial economics Industrial enterprises Industrial production Nazism Netherlands Policy analysis Power relations Raw materials VSWG 2006, 1 War economics Workforce World War Two |
title | Dutch Industrial Companies and the German Occupation, 1940–1945 |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-01T02%3A59%3A41IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Dutch%20Industrial%20Companies%20and%20the%20German%20Occupation,%201940%E2%80%931945&rft.jtitle=Vierteljahrschrift%20fu%CC%88r%20Sozial-%20und%20Wirtschaftsgeschichte&rft.au=Klemann,%20Hein%20A.%20M&rft.date=2006-01-01&rft.volume=93&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=22&rft.pages=1-22&rft.issn=0340-8728&rft.eissn=2365-2136&rft_id=info:doi/&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E20741782%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=36450817&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=20741782&rfr_iscdi=true |