C-TPAT: major challenges

Since its implementation after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) has grown to be one of the largest public/private partnerships in the world. The focus of C-TPAT is on the United States’ vulnerability to the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) across its borders. As a system, C-TPAT has achieved great success; however, there remain a number of serious deficiencies that C-TPAT, by itself, cannot overcome. Very few cargo containers are currently being inspected by Customs and Border Protection (CBP). This is due to lack of funding and manpower deficiencies as well as the practical need to allow the flow of trade to continue as swiftly as possible. Instead of mass inspection of containers, CBP relies on its ability to identify and further question or inspect “high risk” containers before they are shipped or prior to their entry to the United States. Identifying “high risk” containers results in a far lower number of CBP inspections, thereby offering less interference with the trade process. It is well known amongst shipping experts that the contents of many containers are mislabeled or misdeclared. Combine the fact that many cargo containers contain misdeclared contents with the current model of inspecting very few containers and one can conclude that the potential for problems is enormous. Furthermore, concerns over specificity of standards related to C-TPAT security requirements and the likelihood that membership in C-TPAT increases an organization’s potential for attack and the situation continues to deteriorate. C-TPAT began as and remains an initiative with honorable goals; however, we cannot rely upon increasing numbers of C-TPAT members as a measure of its effectiveness.