Computing equilibria for a service provider game with (Im)perfect information
We study fundamental algorithmic questions concerning the complexity of market equilibria under perfect and imperfect information by means of a basic microeconomic game. Suppose a provider offers a service to a set of potential customers. Each customer has a particular demand of service and her beha...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | ACM transactions on algorithms 2006-10, Vol.2 (4), p.679-706 |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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