Machine Ethics in Care: Could a Moral Avatar Enhance the Autonomy of Care-Dependent Persons?
It is a common view that artificial systems could play an important role in dealing with the shortage of caregivers due to demographic change. One argument to show that this is also in the interest of care-dependent persons is that artificial systems might significantly enhance user autonomy since t...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics 2024-07, Vol.33 (3), p.1-359 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 359 |
---|---|
container_issue | 3 |
container_start_page | 1 |
container_title | Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics |
container_volume | 33 |
creator | Misselhorn, Catrin |
description | It is a common view that artificial systems could play an important role in dealing with the shortage of caregivers due to demographic change. One argument to show that this is also in the interest of care-dependent persons is that artificial systems might significantly enhance user autonomy since they might stay longer in their homes. This argument presupposes that the artificial systems in question do not require permanent supervision and control by human caregivers. For this reason, they need the capacity for some degree of moral decision-making and agency to cope with morally relevant situations (artificial morality). Machine ethics provides the theoretical and ethical framework for artificial morality. This article scrutinizes the question how artificial moral agents that enhance user autonomy could look like. It discusses, in particular, the suggestion that they should be designed as moral avatars of their users to enhance user autonomy in a substantial sense. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/S0963180123000555 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_2929030541</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2929030541</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c296t-58acffbb51c52bfbcced39f1cd25ebb8ebfe9e95554b28588afdf4ec0154c32f3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNplkDtPwzAUhS0EouXxA1iQR5aAH3Eas6AqlIfUCiRgQ4ps51oJSu1iJ0j996S0sDDd4Xzfke5B6IySS0ro5OqFyIzTnFDGCSFCiD00pmkmE0bTyT4ab-Jkk4_QUYwfA8MYoYdoxPOBIBkbo_eFMnXjAM-6ujERNw4XKsA1LnzfVljhhQ-qxdMv1amAZ65WzgDuasDTvvPOL9fY2x8luYUVuApch58hRO_izQk6sKqNcLq7x-jtbvZaPCTzp_vHYjpPDJNZl4hcGWu1FtQIpq02BiouLTUVE6B1DtqCBDn8l2qWizxXtrIpGEJFajiz_BhdbHtXwX_2ELty2UQDbasc-D6WTDJJOBEpHVC6RU3wMQaw5So0SxXWJSXlZtTy36iDc76r7_USqj_jd0X-DTUAcdE</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2929030541</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Machine Ethics in Care: Could a Moral Avatar Enhance the Autonomy of Care-Dependent Persons?</title><source>Cambridge Journals</source><creator>Misselhorn, Catrin</creator><creatorcontrib>Misselhorn, Catrin</creatorcontrib><description>It is a common view that artificial systems could play an important role in dealing with the shortage of caregivers due to demographic change. One argument to show that this is also in the interest of care-dependent persons is that artificial systems might significantly enhance user autonomy since they might stay longer in their homes. This argument presupposes that the artificial systems in question do not require permanent supervision and control by human caregivers. For this reason, they need the capacity for some degree of moral decision-making and agency to cope with morally relevant situations (artificial morality). Machine ethics provides the theoretical and ethical framework for artificial morality. This article scrutinizes the question how artificial moral agents that enhance user autonomy could look like. It discusses, in particular, the suggestion that they should be designed as moral avatars of their users to enhance user autonomy in a substantial sense.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0963-1801</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1469-2147</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1017/S0963180123000555</identifier><identifier>PMID: 38214062</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States</publisher><ispartof>Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics, 2024-07, Vol.33 (3), p.1-359</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c296t-58acffbb51c52bfbcced39f1cd25ebb8ebfe9e95554b28588afdf4ec0154c32f3</cites><orcidid>0009-0004-4032-5210</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,777,781,27905,27906</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/38214062$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Misselhorn, Catrin</creatorcontrib><title>Machine Ethics in Care: Could a Moral Avatar Enhance the Autonomy of Care-Dependent Persons?</title><title>Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics</title><addtitle>Camb Q Healthc Ethics</addtitle><description>It is a common view that artificial systems could play an important role in dealing with the shortage of caregivers due to demographic change. One argument to show that this is also in the interest of care-dependent persons is that artificial systems might significantly enhance user autonomy since they might stay longer in their homes. This argument presupposes that the artificial systems in question do not require permanent supervision and control by human caregivers. For this reason, they need the capacity for some degree of moral decision-making and agency to cope with morally relevant situations (artificial morality). Machine ethics provides the theoretical and ethical framework for artificial morality. This article scrutinizes the question how artificial moral agents that enhance user autonomy could look like. It discusses, in particular, the suggestion that they should be designed as moral avatars of their users to enhance user autonomy in a substantial sense.</description><issn>0963-1801</issn><issn>1469-2147</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNplkDtPwzAUhS0EouXxA1iQR5aAH3Eas6AqlIfUCiRgQ4ps51oJSu1iJ0j996S0sDDd4Xzfke5B6IySS0ro5OqFyIzTnFDGCSFCiD00pmkmE0bTyT4ab-Jkk4_QUYwfA8MYoYdoxPOBIBkbo_eFMnXjAM-6ujERNw4XKsA1LnzfVljhhQ-qxdMv1amAZ65WzgDuasDTvvPOL9fY2x8luYUVuApch58hRO_izQk6sKqNcLq7x-jtbvZaPCTzp_vHYjpPDJNZl4hcGWu1FtQIpq02BiouLTUVE6B1DtqCBDn8l2qWizxXtrIpGEJFajiz_BhdbHtXwX_2ELty2UQDbasc-D6WTDJJOBEpHVC6RU3wMQaw5So0SxXWJSXlZtTy36iDc76r7_USqj_jd0X-DTUAcdE</recordid><startdate>20240701</startdate><enddate>20240701</enddate><creator>Misselhorn, Catrin</creator><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7X8</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0009-0004-4032-5210</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20240701</creationdate><title>Machine Ethics in Care: Could a Moral Avatar Enhance the Autonomy of Care-Dependent Persons?</title><author>Misselhorn, Catrin</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c296t-58acffbb51c52bfbcced39f1cd25ebb8ebfe9e95554b28588afdf4ec0154c32f3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Misselhorn, Catrin</creatorcontrib><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><jtitle>Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Misselhorn, Catrin</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Machine Ethics in Care: Could a Moral Avatar Enhance the Autonomy of Care-Dependent Persons?</atitle><jtitle>Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics</jtitle><addtitle>Camb Q Healthc Ethics</addtitle><date>2024-07-01</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>33</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>359</epage><pages>1-359</pages><issn>0963-1801</issn><eissn>1469-2147</eissn><abstract>It is a common view that artificial systems could play an important role in dealing with the shortage of caregivers due to demographic change. One argument to show that this is also in the interest of care-dependent persons is that artificial systems might significantly enhance user autonomy since they might stay longer in their homes. This argument presupposes that the artificial systems in question do not require permanent supervision and control by human caregivers. For this reason, they need the capacity for some degree of moral decision-making and agency to cope with morally relevant situations (artificial morality). Machine ethics provides the theoretical and ethical framework for artificial morality. This article scrutinizes the question how artificial moral agents that enhance user autonomy could look like. It discusses, in particular, the suggestion that they should be designed as moral avatars of their users to enhance user autonomy in a substantial sense.</abstract><cop>United States</cop><pmid>38214062</pmid><doi>10.1017/S0963180123000555</doi><tpages>14</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0009-0004-4032-5210</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 0963-1801 |
ispartof | Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics, 2024-07, Vol.33 (3), p.1-359 |
issn | 0963-1801 1469-2147 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_2929030541 |
source | Cambridge Journals |
title | Machine Ethics in Care: Could a Moral Avatar Enhance the Autonomy of Care-Dependent Persons? |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-19T14%3A08%3A57IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Machine%20Ethics%20in%20Care:%20Could%20a%20Moral%20Avatar%20Enhance%20the%20Autonomy%20of%20Care-Dependent%20Persons?&rft.jtitle=Cambridge%20quarterly%20of%20healthcare%20ethics&rft.au=Misselhorn,%20Catrin&rft.date=2024-07-01&rft.volume=33&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=359&rft.pages=1-359&rft.issn=0963-1801&rft.eissn=1469-2147&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017/S0963180123000555&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2929030541%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2929030541&rft_id=info:pmid/38214062&rfr_iscdi=true |