Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: theory and implementation

We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic incentives facing participants in such auctions, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of values...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Decision Support Systems 1998-11, Vol.24 (1), p.17-27
Hauptverfasser:	Wurman, Peter R, Walsh, William E, Wellman, Michael P
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Algorithms Auctions Decision support systems Double auctions Economic theory Electronic commerce Electronic commerce mechanisms Incentive compatibility Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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