Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form....

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Veröffentlicht in:Mathematical methods of operations research (Heidelberg, Germany) Germany), 2001-04, Vol.53 (1), p.35-49
Hauptverfasser: DRIESSEN, T. S. H, PAULUSMA, D
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Decision theory and game theory
Exact sciences and technology
Mathematical methods in physics
Physics
Probability theory, stochastic processes, and statistics
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Zusammenfassung:Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation.
ISSN:1432-2994
1432-5217
DOI:10.1007/s001860000099