Reforming the Medicare Part D Benefit Design: Financial Implications for Beneficiaries, Private Plans, Drug Manufacturers, and the Federal Government
Reforming the Medicare Part D program—which provides prescription drug coverage to 49 million beneficiaries—has emerged as a key policy priority. The authors evaluate prescription drug claims from a 100% sample of Medicare Part D beneficiaries to evaluate the current spending distribution across dif...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of health politics, policy and law policy and law, 2022-12, Vol.47 (6), p.853-877 |
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container_title | Journal of health politics, policy and law |
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creator | Trish, Erin Kaiser, Katrina M. Celestin, Jeanai Joyce, Geoffrey |
description | Reforming the Medicare Part D program—which provides prescription drug coverage to 49 million beneficiaries—has emerged as a key policy priority.
The authors evaluate prescription drug claims from a 100% sample of Medicare Part D beneficiaries to evaluate the current spending distribution across different payers for different types of beneficiaries across different benefit phases. They then model how these estimates would change under a proposal to redesign the Medicare Part D standard benefit.
Spending patterns differ for beneficiaries who do and do not qualify for low-income subsidies. Part D plans face limited liability for total spending under the current standard benefit design, amounting to 36% of total spending for beneficiaries who do not receive low-income subsidies and 28% of total spending for those who do. Proposed reforms would increase plan liability and significantly change the distribution of liability across plans, drug manufacturers, and the federal government.
Though the original goal of the Part D program was to create a market of competing private plans that provide prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries, the standard benefit design that was included in the original legislation reflected significant political compromises. Reforming the standard benefit design to give plans more skin in the game could significantly affect competition in the market, with differential impact across drug classes and types of beneficiaries. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1215/03616878-10041233 |
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The authors evaluate prescription drug claims from a 100% sample of Medicare Part D beneficiaries to evaluate the current spending distribution across different payers for different types of beneficiaries across different benefit phases. They then model how these estimates would change under a proposal to redesign the Medicare Part D standard benefit.
Spending patterns differ for beneficiaries who do and do not qualify for low-income subsidies. Part D plans face limited liability for total spending under the current standard benefit design, amounting to 36% of total spending for beneficiaries who do not receive low-income subsidies and 28% of total spending for those who do. Proposed reforms would increase plan liability and significantly change the distribution of liability across plans, drug manufacturers, and the federal government.
Though the original goal of the Part D program was to create a market of competing private plans that provide prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries, the standard benefit design that was included in the original legislation reflected significant political compromises. Reforming the standard benefit design to give plans more skin in the game could significantly affect competition in the market, with differential impact across drug classes and types of beneficiaries.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0361-6878</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1527-1927</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1215/03616878-10041233</identifier><identifier>PMID: 35867529</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States: Duke University Press</publisher><subject>Aged ; Beneficiaries ; Competition ; Design ; Design standards ; Drug development ; Drugs ; Expenditures ; Federal Government ; Government ; Government programs ; Humans ; Income ; Insurance coverage ; Legislation ; Liability ; Limited liability ; Low income groups ; Markets ; Medicare ; Medicare Part D ; Medicine and Health ; Pharmaceutical industry ; Political Science ; Politics ; Poverty ; Prescription Drugs ; Public finance ; Public Health and Health Policy ; Public Policy ; Redesign ; Reforming ; Social programs ; Subsidies ; United States</subject><ispartof>Journal of health politics, policy and law, 2022-12, Vol.47 (6), p.853-877</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2022 by Duke University Press.</rights><rights>Copyright Duke University Press, NC & IL Dec 1, 2022</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c402t-f29c0fe653a65415fed658b41ad196b7b5aefebc4dadfc15a0534dafe667798e3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,27843,27901,27902,33751</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35867529$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Trish, Erin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kaiser, Katrina M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Celestin, Jeanai</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Joyce, Geoffrey</creatorcontrib><title>Reforming the Medicare Part D Benefit Design: Financial Implications for Beneficiaries, Private Plans, Drug Manufacturers, and the Federal Government</title><title>Journal of health politics, policy and law</title><addtitle>J Health Polit Policy Law</addtitle><description>Reforming the Medicare Part D program—which provides prescription drug coverage to 49 million beneficiaries—has emerged as a key policy priority.
The authors evaluate prescription drug claims from a 100% sample of Medicare Part D beneficiaries to evaluate the current spending distribution across different payers for different types of beneficiaries across different benefit phases. They then model how these estimates would change under a proposal to redesign the Medicare Part D standard benefit.
Spending patterns differ for beneficiaries who do and do not qualify for low-income subsidies. Part D plans face limited liability for total spending under the current standard benefit design, amounting to 36% of total spending for beneficiaries who do not receive low-income subsidies and 28% of total spending for those who do. Proposed reforms would increase plan liability and significantly change the distribution of liability across plans, drug manufacturers, and the federal government.
Though the original goal of the Part D program was to create a market of competing private plans that provide prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries, the standard benefit design that was included in the original legislation reflected significant political compromises. Reforming the standard benefit design to give plans more skin in the game could significantly affect competition in the market, with differential impact across drug classes and types of beneficiaries.</description><subject>Aged</subject><subject>Beneficiaries</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Design</subject><subject>Design standards</subject><subject>Drug development</subject><subject>Drugs</subject><subject>Expenditures</subject><subject>Federal Government</subject><subject>Government</subject><subject>Government programs</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Income</subject><subject>Insurance coverage</subject><subject>Legislation</subject><subject>Liability</subject><subject>Limited liability</subject><subject>Low income groups</subject><subject>Markets</subject><subject>Medicare</subject><subject>Medicare Part D</subject><subject>Medicine and Health</subject><subject>Pharmaceutical industry</subject><subject>Political Science</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Poverty</subject><subject>Prescription Drugs</subject><subject>Public finance</subject><subject>Public Health and Health Policy</subject><subject>Public Policy</subject><subject>Redesign</subject><subject>Reforming</subject><subject>Social programs</subject><subject>Subsidies</subject><subject>United States</subject><issn>0361-6878</issn><issn>1527-1927</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2022</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>BHHNA</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kc1u1DAUha0KRIfCA3SDLLFhQah_YjvpDlqmVGrVCsE6cuzrqdvEGey4Eg_C--JhZkCqhDe-9v3OuVc6CB1T8oEyKk4Il1Q2qqkoITVlnB-gBRVMVbRl6hlabPrVBjhEL1O6J-VwKl-gQy4aqQRrF-jXV3BTHH1Y4fkO8DVYb3QEfKvjjM_xJwjgfKkg-VU4xUsfdDBeD_hyXA8Fnf0UEi4WO7T0oof0Ht9G_6jnYjToUJ7nMa_wtQ7ZaTPnCLH86WD_DF2ChVgsL6ZHiGGEML9Cz50eErze3Ufo-_Lzt7Mv1dXNxeXZx6vK1ITNlWOtIQ6k4FqKmgoHVoqmr6m2tJW96oUGB72prbbOUKGJ4KUuCqlU2wA_Qu-2vus4_ciQ5m70ycBQdoYpp47JlivV8IYV9O0T9H7KMZTtOqYUkXUhNxTdUiZOKUVw3Tr6UcefHSXdJrNun1m3z6xo3uyccz-C_avYh1SAegvY_AB5HSGlf8P_7_sb2Lqimg</recordid><startdate>202212</startdate><enddate>202212</enddate><creator>Trish, Erin</creator><creator>Kaiser, Katrina M.</creator><creator>Celestin, Jeanai</creator><creator>Joyce, Geoffrey</creator><general>Duke University Press</general><general>Duke University Press, NC & IL</general><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7U3</scope><scope>7U4</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>BHHNA</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>DWI</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>NAPCQ</scope><scope>WZK</scope><scope>7X8</scope></search><sort><creationdate>202212</creationdate><title>Reforming the Medicare Part D Benefit Design: Financial Implications for Beneficiaries, Private Plans, Drug Manufacturers, and the Federal Government</title><author>Trish, Erin ; Kaiser, Katrina M. ; Celestin, Jeanai ; Joyce, Geoffrey</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c402t-f29c0fe653a65415fed658b41ad196b7b5aefebc4dadfc15a0534dafe667798e3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2022</creationdate><topic>Aged</topic><topic>Beneficiaries</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Design</topic><topic>Design standards</topic><topic>Drug development</topic><topic>Drugs</topic><topic>Expenditures</topic><topic>Federal Government</topic><topic>Government</topic><topic>Government programs</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Income</topic><topic>Insurance coverage</topic><topic>Legislation</topic><topic>Liability</topic><topic>Limited liability</topic><topic>Low income groups</topic><topic>Markets</topic><topic>Medicare</topic><topic>Medicare Part D</topic><topic>Medicine and Health</topic><topic>Pharmaceutical industry</topic><topic>Political Science</topic><topic>Politics</topic><topic>Poverty</topic><topic>Prescription Drugs</topic><topic>Public finance</topic><topic>Public Health and Health Policy</topic><topic>Public Policy</topic><topic>Redesign</topic><topic>Reforming</topic><topic>Social programs</topic><topic>Subsidies</topic><topic>United States</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Trish, Erin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kaiser, Katrina M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Celestin, Jeanai</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Joyce, Geoffrey</creatorcontrib><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>Social Services Abstracts</collection><collection>Sociological Abstracts (pre-2017)</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Sociological Abstracts</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>Sociological Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><collection>Nursing & Allied Health Premium</collection><collection>Sociological Abstracts (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><jtitle>Journal of health politics, policy and law</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Trish, Erin</au><au>Kaiser, Katrina M.</au><au>Celestin, Jeanai</au><au>Joyce, Geoffrey</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Reforming the Medicare Part D Benefit Design: Financial Implications for Beneficiaries, Private Plans, Drug Manufacturers, and the Federal Government</atitle><jtitle>Journal of health politics, policy and law</jtitle><addtitle>J Health Polit Policy Law</addtitle><date>2022-12</date><risdate>2022</risdate><volume>47</volume><issue>6</issue><spage>853</spage><epage>877</epage><pages>853-877</pages><issn>0361-6878</issn><eissn>1527-1927</eissn><abstract>Reforming the Medicare Part D program—which provides prescription drug coverage to 49 million beneficiaries—has emerged as a key policy priority.
The authors evaluate prescription drug claims from a 100% sample of Medicare Part D beneficiaries to evaluate the current spending distribution across different payers for different types of beneficiaries across different benefit phases. They then model how these estimates would change under a proposal to redesign the Medicare Part D standard benefit.
Spending patterns differ for beneficiaries who do and do not qualify for low-income subsidies. Part D plans face limited liability for total spending under the current standard benefit design, amounting to 36% of total spending for beneficiaries who do not receive low-income subsidies and 28% of total spending for those who do. Proposed reforms would increase plan liability and significantly change the distribution of liability across plans, drug manufacturers, and the federal government.
Though the original goal of the Part D program was to create a market of competing private plans that provide prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries, the standard benefit design that was included in the original legislation reflected significant political compromises. Reforming the standard benefit design to give plans more skin in the game could significantly affect competition in the market, with differential impact across drug classes and types of beneficiaries.</abstract><cop>United States</cop><pub>Duke University Press</pub><pmid>35867529</pmid><doi>10.1215/03616878-10041233</doi><tpages>25</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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source | MEDLINE; Political Science Complete; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Sociological Abstracts |
subjects | Aged Beneficiaries Competition Design Design standards Drug development Drugs Expenditures Federal Government Government Government programs Humans Income Insurance coverage Legislation Liability Limited liability Low income groups Markets Medicare Medicare Part D Medicine and Health Pharmaceutical industry Political Science Politics Poverty Prescription Drugs Public finance Public Health and Health Policy Public Policy Redesign Reforming Social programs Subsidies United States |
title | Reforming the Medicare Part D Benefit Design: Financial Implications for Beneficiaries, Private Plans, Drug Manufacturers, and the Federal Government |
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