Adversarial attacks on medical machine learning
Emerging vulnerabilities demand new conversations With public and academic attention increasingly focused on the new role of machine learning in the health information economy, an unusual and no-longer-esoteric category of vulnerabilities in machine-learning systems could prove important. These vuln...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science) 2019-03, Vol.363 (6433), p.1287-1289 |
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creator | Finlayson, Samuel G. Bowers, John D. Ito, Joichi Zittrain, Jonathan L. Beam, Andrew L. Kohane, Isaac S. |
description | Emerging vulnerabilities demand new conversations
With public and academic attention increasingly focused on the new role of machine learning in the health information economy, an unusual and no-longer-esoteric category of vulnerabilities in machine-learning systems could prove important. These vulnerabilities allow a small, carefully designed change in how inputs are presented to a system to completely alter its output, causing it to confidently arrive at manifestly wrong conclusions. These advanced techniques to subvert otherwise-reliable machine-learning systems—so-called adversarial attacks—have, to date, been of interest primarily to computer science researchers (
1
). However, the landscape of often-competing interests within health care, and billions of dollars at stake in systems' outputs, implies considerable problems. We outline motivations that various players in the health care system may have to use adversarial attacks and begin a discussion of what to do about them. Far from discouraging continued innovation with medical machine learning, we call for active engagement of medical, technical, legal, and ethical experts in pursuit of efficient, broadly available, and effective health care that machine learning will enable. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1126/science.aaw4399 |
format | Article |
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With public and academic attention increasingly focused on the new role of machine learning in the health information economy, an unusual and no-longer-esoteric category of vulnerabilities in machine-learning systems could prove important. These vulnerabilities allow a small, carefully designed change in how inputs are presented to a system to completely alter its output, causing it to confidently arrive at manifestly wrong conclusions. These advanced techniques to subvert otherwise-reliable machine-learning systems—so-called adversarial attacks—have, to date, been of interest primarily to computer science researchers (
1
). However, the landscape of often-competing interests within health care, and billions of dollars at stake in systems' outputs, implies considerable problems. We outline motivations that various players in the health care system may have to use adversarial attacks and begin a discussion of what to do about them. Far from discouraging continued innovation with medical machine learning, we call for active engagement of medical, technical, legal, and ethical experts in pursuit of efficient, broadly available, and effective health care that machine learning will enable.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0036-8075</identifier><identifier>ISSN: 1095-9203</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1095-9203</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1126/science.aaw4399</identifier><identifier>PMID: 30898923</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States: American Association for the Advancement of Science</publisher><subject>Artificial intelligence ; Fraud ; Health care ; Humans ; Innovations ; Insurance Claim Review ; Learning algorithms ; Machine Learning ; Medical innovations ; POLICY FORUM</subject><ispartof>Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science), 2019-03, Vol.363 (6433), p.1287-1289</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2019, American Association for the Advancement of Science</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c388t-d03cbbfc8d005da85fbbbeb76f8cea92b7946890c6f75dc7b8c086292f96d68d3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c388t-d03cbbfc8d005da85fbbbeb76f8cea92b7946890c6f75dc7b8c086292f96d68d3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,2871,2872,27901,27902</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30898923$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Finlayson, Samuel G.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Bowers, John D.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ito, Joichi</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zittrain, Jonathan L.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Beam, Andrew L.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kohane, Isaac S.</creatorcontrib><title>Adversarial attacks on medical machine learning</title><title>Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science)</title><addtitle>Science</addtitle><description>Emerging vulnerabilities demand new conversations
With public and academic attention increasingly focused on the new role of machine learning in the health information economy, an unusual and no-longer-esoteric category of vulnerabilities in machine-learning systems could prove important. These vulnerabilities allow a small, carefully designed change in how inputs are presented to a system to completely alter its output, causing it to confidently arrive at manifestly wrong conclusions. These advanced techniques to subvert otherwise-reliable machine-learning systems—so-called adversarial attacks—have, to date, been of interest primarily to computer science researchers (
1
). However, the landscape of often-competing interests within health care, and billions of dollars at stake in systems' outputs, implies considerable problems. We outline motivations that various players in the health care system may have to use adversarial attacks and begin a discussion of what to do about them. Far from discouraging continued innovation with medical machine learning, we call for active engagement of medical, technical, legal, and ethical experts in pursuit of efficient, broadly available, and effective health care that machine learning will enable.</description><subject>Artificial intelligence</subject><subject>Fraud</subject><subject>Health care</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Innovations</subject><subject>Insurance Claim Review</subject><subject>Learning algorithms</subject><subject>Machine Learning</subject><subject>Medical innovations</subject><subject>POLICY FORUM</subject><issn>0036-8075</issn><issn>1095-9203</issn><issn>1095-9203</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2019</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><recordid>eNpdkLtPwzAQhy0EoqUwM4EisbCkOduNY49VxUuqxAKz5VcgJY9iJyD-e1w1dGA4nXT33U-nD6FLDHOMCcuCqVxr3Fyp7wUV4ghNMYg8FQToMZoCUJZyKPIJOgthAxB3gp6iCQUuuCB0irKl_XI-KF-pOlF9r8xHSLo2aZytTBw1yrxXrUtqp3xbtW_n6KRUdXAXY5-h1_u7l9Vjun5-eFot16mhnPepBWq0Lg23ALlVPC-11k4XrOTGKUF0IRaMCzCsLHJrCs0NcEYEKQWzjFs6Q7f73K3vPgcXetlUwbi6Vq3rhiAJFiwnOMZE9OYfuukG38bvJIkeMI-1o7I9ZXwXgnel3PqqUf5HYpA7l3J0KUeX8eJ6zB101HHg_-RF4GoPbELf-cOeMEYh55z-AiHUetw</recordid><startdate>20190322</startdate><enddate>20190322</enddate><creator>Finlayson, Samuel G.</creator><creator>Bowers, John D.</creator><creator>Ito, Joichi</creator><creator>Zittrain, Jonathan L.</creator><creator>Beam, Andrew L.</creator><creator>Kohane, Isaac S.</creator><general>American Association for the Advancement of Science</general><general>The American Association for the Advancement of Science</general><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7QF</scope><scope>7QG</scope><scope>7QL</scope><scope>7QP</scope><scope>7QQ</scope><scope>7QR</scope><scope>7SC</scope><scope>7SE</scope><scope>7SN</scope><scope>7SP</scope><scope>7SR</scope><scope>7SS</scope><scope>7T7</scope><scope>7TA</scope><scope>7TB</scope><scope>7TK</scope><scope>7TM</scope><scope>7U5</scope><scope>7U9</scope><scope>8BQ</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>C1K</scope><scope>F28</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>H8D</scope><scope>H8G</scope><scope>H94</scope><scope>JG9</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>L~C</scope><scope>L~D</scope><scope>M7N</scope><scope>P64</scope><scope>RC3</scope><scope>7X8</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20190322</creationdate><title>Adversarial attacks on medical machine learning</title><author>Finlayson, Samuel G. ; 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With public and academic attention increasingly focused on the new role of machine learning in the health information economy, an unusual and no-longer-esoteric category of vulnerabilities in machine-learning systems could prove important. These vulnerabilities allow a small, carefully designed change in how inputs are presented to a system to completely alter its output, causing it to confidently arrive at manifestly wrong conclusions. These advanced techniques to subvert otherwise-reliable machine-learning systems—so-called adversarial attacks—have, to date, been of interest primarily to computer science researchers (
1
). However, the landscape of often-competing interests within health care, and billions of dollars at stake in systems' outputs, implies considerable problems. We outline motivations that various players in the health care system may have to use adversarial attacks and begin a discussion of what to do about them. Far from discouraging continued innovation with medical machine learning, we call for active engagement of medical, technical, legal, and ethical experts in pursuit of efficient, broadly available, and effective health care that machine learning will enable.</abstract><cop>United States</cop><pub>American Association for the Advancement of Science</pub><pmid>30898923</pmid><doi>10.1126/science.aaw4399</doi><tpages>3</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | Artificial intelligence Fraud Health care Humans Innovations Insurance Claim Review Learning algorithms Machine Learning Medical innovations POLICY FORUM |
title | Adversarial attacks on medical machine learning |
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