Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes

Proper scoring rules provide convenient and highly efficient tools for incentive-compatible elicitations of subjective beliefs. As traditionally used, however, they are valid only under expected value maximization. This paper shows how they can be generalized to modern ("non-expected utility&qu...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The Review of economic studies 2009-10, Vol.76 (4), p.1461-1489
Hauptverfasser: OFFERMAN, THEO, SONNEMANS, JOEP, VAN DE KUILEN, GIJS, WAKKER, PETER P
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Proper scoring rules provide convenient and highly efficient tools for incentive-compatible elicitations of subjective beliefs. As traditionally used, however, they are valid only under expected value maximization. This paper shows how they can be generalized to modern ("non-expected utility") theories of risk and ambiguity, yielding mutual benefits: users of scoring rules can benefit from the empirical realism of non-expected utility, and analysts of ambiguity attitudes can benefit from efficient measurements using proper scoring rules. An experiment demonstrates the feasibility of our generalization.
ISSN:0034-6527
1467-937X
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00557.x