Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes
Proper scoring rules provide convenient and highly efficient tools for incentive-compatible elicitations of subjective beliefs. As traditionally used, however, they are valid only under expected value maximization. This paper shows how they can be generalized to modern ("non-expected utility&qu...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Review of economic studies 2009-10, Vol.76 (4), p.1461-1489 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Proper scoring rules provide convenient and highly efficient tools for incentive-compatible elicitations of subjective beliefs. As traditionally used, however, they are valid only under expected value maximization. This paper shows how they can be generalized to modern ("non-expected utility") theories of risk and ambiguity, yielding mutual benefits: users of scoring rules can benefit from the empirical realism of non-expected utility, and analysts of ambiguity attitudes can benefit from efficient measurements using proper scoring rules. An experiment demonstrates the feasibility of our generalization. |
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ISSN: | 0034-6527 1467-937X |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00557.x |