Property Identity

Property Identity

The question of how properties are individuated is extremely important. Consider the following proposals. To be in pain is to be in a certain neurological state. To be red is to appear red to normal observers in standard conditions. To be obligatory is to maximize the good. Each makes a claim of pro...

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Veröffentlicht in:Philosophy compass 2016-12, Vol.11 (12), p.829-840
1. Verfasser: Audi, Paul
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Sprache:eng
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Metaphysics
Philosophy
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description The question of how properties are individuated is extremely important. Consider the following proposals. To be in pain is to be in a certain neurological state. To be red is to appear red to normal observers in standard conditions. To be obligatory is to maximize the good. Each makes a claim of property identity. Each is a substantive metaphysical thesis of wide interest. None can be studied with due scrutiny in the absence of a general account of property identity. Here, I will survey existing accounts and suggest a new account in terms of grounding that has some advantages over the other candidates.
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subjects Metaphysics
Philosophy
title Property Identity
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