Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources

Maintaining human cooperation in the context of common-pool resource management is extremely important because otherwise we risk overuse and corruption. To analyse the interplay between economic and ecological factors leading to corruption, we couple the resource dynamics and the evolutionary dynami...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of theoretical biology 2017-09, Vol.428, p.76-86
Hauptverfasser:	Lee, Joung-Hun, Jusup, Marko, Iwasa, Yoh
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Biological Evolution Bribe Conservation of Natural Resources Cooperative Behavior Delegated enforcement Game Theory Humans Illegal logging Models, Theoretical Overfishing Resource management Social Behavior
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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