Two-stage network games
In the paper, two-stage network games are studied. At the first stage of the game, the players form a network, while at the second stage they choose strategies according to the network realized at the first stage. Both noncooperative and cooperative settings are considered. In the noncooperative cas...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Automation and remote control 2016-10, Vol.77 (10), p.1855-1866 |
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| container_issue | 10 |
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| container_title | Automation and remote control |
| container_volume | 77 |
| creator | Petrosyan, L. A. Sedakov, A. A. Bochkarev, A. O. |
| description | In the paper, two-stage network games are studied. At the first stage of the game, the players form a network, while at the second stage they choose strategies according to the network realized at the first stage. Both noncooperative and cooperative settings are considered. In the noncooperative case, the Nash equilibrium is used as a solution concept, whereas the cooperative setting involves an allocation (the Shapley value) as a solution concept. It is demonstrated that the Shapley value does not satisfy the time consistency property. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1134/S000511791610012X |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Automation and remote control, 2016-10, Vol.77 (10), p.1855-1866 |
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| subjects | Allocations CAE) and Design Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control Optimization Computer-Aided Engineering (CAD Consistency Control Economic models Game theory Games Mathematical Game Theory and Applications Mathematics Mathematics and Statistics Mechanical Engineering Mechatronics Networks Players Remote control Robotics Strategy Systems Theory |
| title | Two-stage network games |
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