Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n
This article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal "Law of 1/n" and "Leviathan" theories, which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs relate...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Southern economic journal 2015-01, Vol.81 (3), p.742-768 |
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| container_end_page | 768 |
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| container_title | Southern economic journal |
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| creator | Crowley, George R. |
| description | This article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal "Law of 1/n" and "Leviathan" theories, which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government (which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases) and the costs of distributive politics (which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases). Using a panel of U.S. state and local government spending data, empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the Leviathan model is partially offset by the Law of 1/n. This result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.4284/0038-4038-2013.075 |
| format | Article |
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Using a panel of U.S. state and local government spending data, empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the Leviathan model is partially offset by the Law of 1/n. 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0038-4038 |
| ispartof | Southern economic journal, 2015-01, Vol.81 (3), p.742-768 |
| issn | 0038-4038 2325-8012 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1891443431 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Competition Economic models Government spending H11 H72 H77 Local government Public expenditure |
| title | Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n |
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