Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects

We consider sequential second-price auctions in which heterogeneous objects are sold to bidders with unit demand and a single dimensional type. We show that a symmetric increasing equilibrium exists if objects are ordered in terms of dispersiveness of value distributions. Equilibrium price declines...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economics letters 2016-12, Vol.149, p.49-51
Hauptverfasser:	Muramoto, Akitoshi, Sano, Ryuji
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Auctions Bid price Declining price anomaly Demand Dispersiveness Equilibrium Sequential auctions Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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