Jurisdiction Size and Local Government Policy Expenditure: Assessing the Effect of Municipal Amalgamation

Across the developed world, the last 50 years have seen a dramatic wave of municipal mergers, often motivated by a quest for economies of scale. Re-examining the theoretical arguments invoked to justify these reforms, we find that, in fact, there is no compelling reason to expect them to yield net g...

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Veröffentlicht in:The American political science review 2016-11, Vol.110 (4), p.812-831
Hauptverfasser: BLOM-HANSEN, JENS, HOULBERG, KURT, SERRITZLEW, SØREN, TREISMAN, DANIEL
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creator BLOM-HANSEN, JENS
HOULBERG, KURT
SERRITZLEW, SØREN
TREISMAN, DANIEL
description Across the developed world, the last 50 years have seen a dramatic wave of municipal mergers, often motivated by a quest for economies of scale. Re-examining the theoretical arguments invoked to justify these reforms, we find that, in fact, there is no compelling reason to expect them to yield net gains. Potential savings in, for example, administrative costs are likely to be offset by opposite effects for other domains. Past attempts at empirical assessment have been bedeviled by endogeneity—which municipalities amalgamate is typically nonrandom—creating a danger of bias. We exploit the particular characteristics of a recent Danish reform to provide more credible difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of mergers. The result turns out to be null: cost savings in some areas were offset by deterioration in others, while for most public services jurisdiction size did not matter at all. Given significant transition costs, the finding raises questions about the rationale behind a global movement that has already restructured local government on almost all continents.
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source Jstor Complete Legacy; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Cambridge University Press Journals Complete
subjects Acquisitions & mergers
Bias
Control Groups
Cost control
Developed Nations
Economic reform
Economies of scale
Jurisdiction
Local government
Municipalities
Policy making
Political science
Public policy
Public services
Reforms
Roads & highways
School districts
Special Needs Students
title Jurisdiction Size and Local Government Policy Expenditure: Assessing the Effect of Municipal Amalgamation
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