Can Anyone Stop the President? Power Asymmetries and Term Limits in Latin America, 1984-2016

Since the late twentieth century, numerous Latin American nations have launched efforts to relax presidential term limits, often successfully. This article discusses the conditions under which countries succeed in relaxing term limits. Drawing from bargaining models and reviewing 36 cases, it makes...

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description Since the late twentieth century, numerous Latin American nations have launched efforts to relax presidential term limits, often successfully. This article discusses the conditions under which countries succeed in relaxing term limits. Drawing from bargaining models and reviewing 36 cases, it makes three arguments. First, actors' preferences are fairly predictable on the basis of officeholding: presidents are the most prominent actors pushing for expansion of term limits; opposition parties lead the resistance. Second, power asymmetry, measured by presidential approval ratings, is the best predictor of success, better than ideology or share of seats in Congress. Third, the only hope for stopping popular presidents rests with ruling parties and the courts, but only when the latter are sufficiently independent.
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source Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Cambridge University Press Journals Complete
subjects 20th century
Courts
Democracy
Heads of state
Incumbents
Latin American politics
Legislatures
Limitations
Opposition parties
Political campaigns
Political ideologies
Political opposition
Political parties
Political power
Power
Presidential approval
Presidential powers
Presidents
Referendums
Resistance
Self dealing
Term limitations
Term of office
title Can Anyone Stop the President? Power Asymmetries and Term Limits in Latin America, 1984-2016
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