Lame-Duck Foreign Policy
It is widely lamented that lame‐duck presidents are do‐nothing presidents. But systematic studies of these periods focus almost exclusively on domestic policy, ignoring the implications for foreign affairs. In this article, I argue that presidents are no less ambitious at the end of their time in of...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Presidential studies quarterly 2016-12, Vol.46 (4), p.849-867 |
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| container_title | Presidential studies quarterly |
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| creator | Potter, Philip B. K. |
| description | It is widely lamented that lame‐duck presidents are do‐nothing presidents. But systematic studies of these periods focus almost exclusively on domestic policy, ignoring the implications for foreign affairs. In this article, I argue that presidents are no less ambitious at the end of their time in office and the desire to cement their historical legacies can even make them more so. However, this ambition is checked by a substantial increase in the constraints imposed by other political actors—most notably Congress. This mismatch between incentives and opportunity pushes presidents toward foreign policy, where meaningful achievements are still possible due to greater presidential autonomy. The result is an increase in diplomacy, and international agreements, and use of force. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/psq.12322 |
| format | Article |
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K.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c6832-263cd53529e3001e226066e863a3de3813da5ce32b483983c24bb51c7a088a323</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2016</creationdate><topic>Analysis</topic><topic>bilateral investment</topic><topic>Commercial treaties</topic><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Democracy</topic><topic>Diplomacy</topic><topic>Foreign policy</topic><topic>Health care policy</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><topic>International relations</topic><topic>lame duck</topic><topic>Legislatures</topic><topic>Political activity</topic><topic>Political aspects</topic><topic>Politics</topic><topic>President of the United States</topic><topic>Presidential-Congressional relations (United States)</topic><topic>Presidents</topic><topic>Primaries & caucuses</topic><topic>Term limitations</topic><topic>Trade agreements</topic><topic>use of force</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Potter, Philip B. 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K.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Lame-Duck Foreign Policy</atitle><jtitle>Presidential studies quarterly</jtitle><addtitle>Presidential Studies Quarterly</addtitle><date>2016-12</date><risdate>2016</risdate><volume>46</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>849</spage><epage>867</epage><pages>849-867</pages><issn>0360-4918</issn><eissn>1741-5705</eissn><coden>PSQUDS</coden><abstract>It is widely lamented that lame‐duck presidents are do‐nothing presidents. But systematic studies of these periods focus almost exclusively on domestic policy, ignoring the implications for foreign affairs. In this article, I argue that presidents are no less ambitious at the end of their time in office and the desire to cement their historical legacies can even make them more so. However, this ambition is checked by a substantial increase in the constraints imposed by other political actors—most notably Congress. This mismatch between incentives and opportunity pushes presidents toward foreign policy, where meaningful achievements are still possible due to greater presidential autonomy. The result is an increase in diplomacy, and international agreements, and use of force.</abstract><cop>Washington</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/psq.12322</doi><tpages>19</tpages></addata></record> |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; HeinOnline; Wiley Online Library Journals; JSTOR |
| subjects | Analysis bilateral investment Commercial treaties Decision making Democracy Diplomacy Foreign policy Health care policy Incentives International relations lame duck Legislatures Political activity Political aspects Politics President of the United States Presidential-Congressional relations (United States) Presidents Primaries & caucuses Term limitations Trade agreements use of force |
| title | Lame-Duck Foreign Policy |
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