Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms, R&D Competition, and Innovation

This article evaluates the innovation consequences of antitrust enforcement against the exclusionary conduct of dominant firms through a Nash equilibrium model of research and development (R&D) competition to create new products. In the two-firm model, whether one firm regards the other's R...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Review of industrial organization 2016-05, Vol.48 (3), p.269-287
1. Verfasser:	Baker, Jonathan B.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Antitrust Antitrust laws Competition Cost reduction Economic competition Economic models Economic statistics Economic theory Economics Economics and Finance Enforcement Foreclosure Game theory Industrial economics Industrial Organization Investment strategies Investments Marginal costs Microeconomics Monopolies Nash equilibrium Operating systems Product development Product innovation Product markets R Antitrust laws R&D Research & development Return on investment Studies Success Sufficient conditions Technological innovation
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!